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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines problems that states face when using private military companies 
(PMCs) and possible solutions for solving those problems. The main argument of this 
thesis is that the problems and their solutions are not the same for all states. They change 
mainly because of the capability of state institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, 
national laws, and public armed forces. For that reason, the problems and solutions are 
examined from the aspect of two types of states: strong state and weak state. The use of 
private military companies in Iraq, which represents two types of states (the U.S. and 
Iraq), is the main case of this thesis. 
The goal of this thesis is to answer the following questions: Which theory of civil 
military relations can be a guide for regulating PMCs from the aspects of control, 
effectiveness and efficiency? What are the main challenges of the U.S. as a strong state 
and of Iraq as a weak state? What are the motives and capabilities of the U.S. and Iraq to 
regulate PMCs? How can national regulations be supported at the international level? 
In this context, principal agent theory and new institutionalism can explain the 
structure and current tensions of state-PMCs relations. The solutions for regulation 
mainly depend on the capabilities of national institutions, which affect the principal-agent 
relations between states and PMCs. Weak states, such as Iraq, are more vulnerable to the 
challenges PMCs cause than strong states such as the U.S.  Moreover, weak states do not 
have sufficient capacity to solve the problems in the near future, except by putting 
limitations on foreign PMCs and operational functions. In contrast, strong states have the 
capacity for solving these problems. They need political will, however, to do so. 
Moreover, international regulation is an indispensible element for effective regulation 
over private military industry due to the industry’s transnational feature. 
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A. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATIONS  
1. Definition 
In the literature, there is no clear definition of private military companies (PMCs). 
Even in international legal documents, there are almost no definitions of PMCs. In 
summer 2009, an international attempt to draft a convention on defining and regulating 
PMCs was made by a working group in the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights.1 According to the draft convention, “A Private Military and/or Security Company 
(PMSC) is a corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or 
security services, including investigation services, by physical persons and/or legal 
entities.”2   
On the other hand, opponents of using PMCs call them mercenaries. However, the 
discussion about whether PMCs are mercenaries or legal entities will likely continue due 
to the absence of clear and unanimous definitions of both mercenaries and PMCs. 
The dictionary meaning of mercenary is one who “serves merely for wages; 
especially, a soldier hired into foreign service.”3 The only definition of mercenaries in 
international law is in Article 47 of Additional Protocol to Geneva Conventions. It states”  
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war.  
2.  A mercenary is any person who:  
(a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
an armed conflict;  
                                                 
1 Jennifer K. Elsea, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues,” 
Congressional Research Service, December 22, 2009, 8, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf  (accessed January 17, 2010).  
2 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Draft International Convention 
on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies,” Final draft for 
distribution, July 13, 2009, 6 available at  http://www.mgimo.ru/files/121626/draft.pdf  (accessed January 
22, 2010). 
3 Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary.  
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(b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c)  Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
in the armed forces of that Party;  
(d)  Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
(e)  Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and  
(f)  Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.4 
The definition is so narrow that modern private military contractors cannot be 
called mercenaries using this definition. In the third chapter, this legal definition of 
mercenaries will be discussed in detail. As for the academic literature, there is no 
unanimous definition of mercenaries. Newell and Sheehy stated that “it is clear that it at 
least includes a person who is foreign to a conflict participating in combat with the aim of 
securing personal gain.”5 Singer presents a similar definition of mercenaries. Also, in 
order to differentiate PMCs from mercenary units, he says that “mercenary units are 
temporary and ad hoc groupings of individual soldiers.”6 Contrary to these definitions, 
others include all military activities that are performed by PMCs, as a definition of 
mercenaries. For example, Nathan says that “By mercenaries I mean soldiers hired by a 
foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed conflict 
—whether directly by engaging in hostilities, or indirectly through training, logistics, 
intelligence or advisory services—and who do so outside the authority of the government 
and defense force of their own country.”7 The important point in Nathan’s definition 
                                                 
4 Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Part 3, Article 47, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079 
(accessed July 26, 2009). 
5 Virginia Newell and Benedict Sheehy, “Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interactions, and 
Reactions,” Texas International Law Journal 41, no. 1  (Winter 2006), 71. 
6 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2003),  43. 
7 Laurie Nathan, “Lethal Weapons: Why Africa Needs Alternatives to Hired Guns,” Track Two 6, no. 
2 (1997), 10, http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/3/p10.html (accessed August 2, 2009).  
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concerns acting without authority from a home state; PMCs are mercenaries. Another 
definition by Goddard is, “An individual or organization financed to act for a foreign 
entity within a military style framework (including conduct of military-style operations) 
without regard for ideals, legal or moral commitments, and domestic and international 
law.”8 In addition to covering all military tasks, Goddard’s definition includes not only 
individuals, but organizations, as well. 
2. Classifications of Private Military Companies 
Due to the absence of a clear and unanimous definition of PMCs, scholars have 
been using many different terms to refer to them; Private Military Companies (PMC), 
Private Security Companies (PSC), Private Military Firms (PMF), Military Service 
Providers (MSP), Mercenary Companies, Private Military/Security Contractors, etc. 
Moreover, the term of military/security contractors has been used to refer both to  
companies and to individual employees. The use of different terms for the same subject 
and the use of the same term for different subjects creates confusion in the literature. 
Moreover, besides the inconsistent use of terms, classification of private military industry 
is another unclear issue in the literature. 
There are different classifications of private military industry in the literature. The 
first classification was made by a British “Green Paper.” It classifies the industry 
according to the services provided; a) combat and operational support, b) military advice 
and training, c) arms procurement, d) intelligence gathering, e) security and crime 
investigation, and f) logistical support.9  
Doug Brooks, the president of the International Peace Operations Association, 
makes another classification in response to the “Green Paper.” He says that a simpler 
                                                 
8 S. Goddard, “The Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity within Modern 
Conflict,” Master’s Thesis, (Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, 2001), 8. 
9 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Private Military Companies: Options for 
Regulation,” London: The Stationary Office, HC 577, February 12, 2002, 10, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf4/fco_pdf_privatemilitarycompanies (accessed May 11, 2009). 
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classification is needed for the purpose of regulation.10 He calls the industry Military 
Service Providers (MSPs) and divides it into three categories; a) Nonlethal Service 
Providers (NSPs), b) Private Security Companies (PSCs), and c) Private Military 
Companies (PMCs).11 He further defines specific functions in the categories as:12  
(1)   NSP: Mine Clearance, Logistics and Supply, Risk Consulting. 
(2)  PSC: Industrial Site Protection, Embassy Protection, Humanitarian 
Aid Protection. 
(3)  PMC: Military Training, Military Intelligence, Offensive Combat. 
The third classification is provided by Peter Singer who names the companies 
generally as Private Military Firms (PMFs) and classifies them into three categories. 
These categories are: a) military provider firms (implementation and command), b) 
military consultant firms (advisory and training) and c) military support firms (nonlethal 
aid and assistance).13 In his classification, he uses the “Tip of the Spear” metaphor, which 
he thinks is a useful analogy from the military perspective.14 The main characteristic of 
this classification is that it focuses on the location of the services in a battlefield and the 
impact of companies on the operations.  
The next classification is Deborah Avant’s, which was developed as a response to 
Singer’s classification. She also uses the “Tip of the Spear” metaphor, but she classifies 
contracts rather than firms.15 Pointing to Singer’s classification, she says, “While the 
distinction between service types makes sense, the same PSC may provide type-one 
services in one contract and type-three in another….Thus I use contracts rather than firms 
                                                 
10 Doug Brooks, “Protecting People: the PMC Potential,” a working document presented as Comments 
and Suggestions for the UK Green Paper on Regulating Private Military Services, July 25, 2002, 2. 
available at http://www.hoosier84.com/0725brookspmcregs.pdf (accessed June 26, 2009). 
11 Brooks, “Protecting People: the PMC Potential,” 2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 93. 
14 Ibid., 91. 
15 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, (N.Y.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 17. 
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as the unit of analysis.”16 Moreover, she also classifies the services into two parts as 
police and military functions. The categories of her classification from the “tip” to the 
“end” of the spear are:  
(1)  Military Functions - armed operational support, unarmed 
operational support on the battlefield, unarmed military advice and 
training, and logistical support. 
(2)  Police Functions - armed site security, unarmed site security, 
police advice and training, crime prevention and intelligence.17 
The last classification belongs to Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens. In their 
report, they examined Singer’s and Avant’s classifications. They present a new 
classification that is more comprehensive than Singer’s and Avant’s.18 The key 
difference in their classification is the use of the capabilities of individual PMCs as the 
base factor. They argue that “an analysis of what tasks firms have been performing over 
time does not capture firms’ potential movement around the spear. There is an even 
broader scope of latent activity.”19 They present three main categories for capabilities of 
PMCs;  
(1)  Operations: attack operations, protection services, 
(2)  Advisory & Training: advisory, training, 
(3)  Support Services: In this category, they presented a lot of sub-
categories ranging from tactical equipment maintenance and 
operation to admin services. 
In this research, I will use the classification of Dew and Hudgens because of its 
simple and comprehensive nature. In regard to first category, I will use the term 
“operational military functions (services)” for attack operations in order to include 
defensive military operations that are different from protective services. 
                                                 
16 Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 17. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens, “The Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey,” Acquisition 
Research Sponsored Report Series, NPS-AM-08-012, prepared for Naval Postgraduate School, August 11, 
2008, 18, available at http://acquisitionresearch.net/_files/FY2008/NPS-AM-08-012.pdf (accessed August 
19, 2009). 
19 Ibid., 17. 
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In regard to companies, I will use Private Military Companies (PMCs) to refer to 
the companies that fulfill at least one military or police function in the range of logistical 
support to operational services. I will use the term Private Security Companies (PSCs), 
which are also of PMCs, to refer to companies who perform only armed and/or unarmed 
protection services. In order to refer to employees of PMCs, I will use the terms “private 
military employees” or “individual contractors.” And to mention the industry as a whole, 
I will use the term “Private Military Industry” (PMI). 
B. BRIEF HISTORY AND THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES 
The use of mercenaries is as old as war. According to Singer, “The first official 
historic reference is of mercenaries who served in the army of King Shulgi of Ur (ca. 
2094-2047 B.C.E).”20  But, “the battle of Kadesh (1294 BCE) is the first great battle in 
history of which we have any detailed information [about use of mercenaries].”21 
Moreover, in a Persian civil war (in 401–400 B.C.E), Greek soldiers who were called 
“Ten Thousands” were hired to fight.22 In the next period, the Carthaginian Empire was 
highly dependent on mercenaries in the First Punic War (264–241 B.C.E) and the Second 
Punic War (218–202 B.C.E). In this period, one of the important characteristics of Rome 
was having a citizen army. However, it relied on mercenary armies, too.23 Moreover, in 
different time periods, mercenaries were used by other states such as Egypt and the 
Byzantine Empire.24 As for the Middle Ages, Mercenaries continued to be an integral 
part of medieval armies. European Armies, especially Italian city states, heavily relied on 
hired soldiers in the condotta (contract) system.25  
                                                 
20 Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 20. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 21. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 20–22. 
25 Ibid., 22. 
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According to Singer, even though the first mercenaries were seen in ancient times, 
the first military companies were seen in the Hundred Years War period (1337–1453).26 
He also points out that PMCs usually arise in situations in which political order and 
stability are absent, especially in past periods of war.27 Singer explains the logic of the 
proliferation of PMCs by stating:  
The absence of centralized control created a situation optimal for the 
private soldier. While originally many soldiers hired themselves out as 
“free lances” (the origin of the modern business term), sooner or later the 
money ran out or that phase of the war came to an end. In either case, the 
soldiers were left without employment. Having no homes or careers to 
return to, many of these soldiers formed “Companies” (derived from “con 
pane,” designating the bread that members received). These were 
organizations designed to facilitate their employment as a group or, at the 
very least, provide one another sustenance and protection. They would 
travel together in search of work, usually in the form of new campaigns to 
fight, and support themselves along the way by blackmailing towns and 
villages.28 
The recent rise of the industry occurred again in the unstable situation that 
emerged after the end of the Cold War. As stated by Turcan and Ozpinar, “after the end 
of the bipolar international system, a stable order in which nation-states were the premier 
players and their interests were the fundamental determiners of their behaviors, a power 
vacuum emerged in many problematic regions.”29 And, as noted by Schreier and 
Caparini, “the end of the bipolar confrontation led to diminished great power interests in 
these [problematic] areas.”30 Moreover, as emphasized by Isenberg, “the end of the Cold 
War gave states a reason to downsize their military forces, freeing up millions of former 
                                                 
26 Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 23. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Ibid., 24. 
29 Metin Turcan and Nihat Ozpinar, “’Who Let the Dogs Out?’: A Critique of the Security for Hire 
Option in Weak States,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, First Published on January 18, 2010, 4, 
available at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/17467580903532068 
(accessed January 19, 2010). 
30 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private 
Military and Security Companies,” paper presented as part of the policy dialogue on issues pertaining to the 
core mission of Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva,  March 
2005,  Occasional Paper No: 6, 3. 
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military personnel from a wide variety of countries, many of them Western.”31 Schreier 
and Caparini estimate the numbers of those military personnel, who found themselves 
unemployed, as seven million.32 
Thus, skilled personnel as employees and unstable states as potential clients were 
available for a private military industry (PMI). As a result, PMCs filled the gap caused by 
the end of the Cold War. According to Avant, private military or security companies were 
used extensively by states, international organizations, global corporations, NGOs and 
individuals since the end of the Cold War.33 Avant stated that “every multi –lateral peace 
operation conducted by the UN since 1990 included the presence of PSCs.”34 Moreover, 
she adds that the states that outsourced military services ranged from strong capable 
states like the U.S. to weak states such as Sierra Leone. Furthermore, Avant used 
financial data in order to show the rapid proliferation of the PMI. She argued that annual 
revenues of the industry increased from $55.6 billion dollars in 1990 to over $100 billion 
in 2003. And it would be about $200 billion dollars in 2010 according to the financial 
estimates of the industry.35 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
RESEARCH 
1. Major Research Questions 
PMCs have been hired for different purposes by different states, particularly by 
the United States. As stated above, after the Cold War, the number of PMCs has 
increased. While the ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel in the Gulf War 
was 1 to 55, in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, it was about 1 to 1.36 Because of their 
                                                 
31 David Isenberg, “A Government In Search of Cover: PMCs in Iraq,” paper presented as part of the 
conference Market Forces: Regulating Private Military Companies, for British American Security 
Information Council, at New York University School of Law, New York, 23–24 March 2006, 3. 
32 Schreier and Caparini, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and 
Security Companies,” 4. 
33 Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 7. 
 34Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 8. 
36 Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” prepared at the 
request of the Senate Committee on the Budget, August 2008, 13. 
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intense use in Iraq by coalition forces, some problems about their legal status, contracting 
process, control and oversight have emerged. These problems require national solutions 
as well as effective support from the international level. 
Furthermore, the types and levels of dangers that states face are not same. 
Incapable or failed states, such as Iraq, are more vulnerable than capable or strong states, 
such as the U.S. Thus, at the national level the priorities and approaches of states must be 
different. Moreover, international regulation must be established in order to reinforce 
national regulations because of the transnational nature of the PMI. 
Based on these facts, my research question is, “What are the motives and 
capabilities of Iraq and the U.S. to regulate PMCs? And how can they be supported at the 
international level?” 
2. Importance of the Research 
Although the PMI is not a new phenomenon, it has been strengthened by 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR), 93 companies have provided physical security services for $5.9 
billion in Iraq.37 This large dollar amount shows the importance of the industry in Iraq 
and, it does not appear that this will decrease significantly in the near future. On the 
contrary, this may increase, especially after the projected withdrawal of U.S. troops. This 
is because the withdrawal of U.S. troops does not mean that Iraq Security Forces (ISF) 
will be capable of providing effective security throughout the entire country. 
Furthermore, U.S. facilities such as the embassy and private companies, which will 
continue their reconstruction tasks, will need PMCs. Thus, the need for PMCs will 
probably increase.  
Because of the extensive use of PMCs, Iraq is a good case study to illustrate what 
kind of problems may emerge when using PMCs. Also, it offers a good contrast between 
the U.S. and Iraq, states on opposite ends of capabilities. One state is Iraq, a new 
                                                 
37 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Comprehensive Plan For Audits of Private 
Security Contractors to Meet the Requirements of Section 842 of Public Law 110-181,” October 17, 2008 
(updated at May 8,2009), 2, available at http://www.sigir.mil/audits/pdf/Section_842.pdf (accessed August 
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democratic state and the other is the U.S., a superpower that has developed state 
institutions having the potential to regulate PMCs. 
In my thesis research, my first objective is to show the different challenges PMCs 
pose for the U.S. and Iraq, because without defining the real challenges, reaching proper 
solutions is not possible. To expect these challenges to be the same for both countries is 
not logical. Thus, the solutions should not be expected to be the same. Moreover, because 
of the transnational nature of the PMI, national measures would not be sufficient without 
the support of international regulations. 
In my research, I will examine this important problem of states for which an 
effective solution has been sought by the international community. To find a solution as 
soon as possible is as important as the quality of the solution itself, because each day 
countries increase the dependency on PMCs, and the PMI gains more power.  
D. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II: Private Military Companies and Theories of Civil-
Military Relations 
As part of political science, Civil-Military Relations (CMR) has dealt with the 
relationships between governments and the military for decades. The main concern of the 
scholars of CMR has been only the control over the military by governments. Therefore, 
the main purpose of prominent theories of CMR has been to find ways to make the 
military a tool of the state. The most prominent theories are militarizing the military with 
professionalism (objective civilian control); civilianizing the military with 
professionalism; the principal-agent theory; interservice rivalry and mission-threat based 
control. The inventors of theories dealt with only the control problems in the relationships 
between government and the military. 
Bruneau and Matei have brought strong insight into CMR. They argued that 
police forces, which sometimes perform military-like missions and intelligence agencies, 
should be examined as elements of CMR.38 Moreover, they argue that examining only 
                                                 
38 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military-Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008), 916. 
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the control issue is not sufficient to determine the real tensions in CMR. “What security 
forces do, and at what cost, that is, their effectiveness and efficiency, and the implications 
of their roles and missions for democracy” are also important issues for CMR.39  
PMCs have been implementing the functions of all three security instruments for 
years. So, it is not wrong to say that PMI is an alternative security provider for states. 
Thus, PMCs must be included in the study of CMR. In this chapter, I will discuss the 
theories of CMR and whether they can cover PMCs. The main argument of this chapter 
will be that principal-agent theory and new institutionalism are the most promising ones 
for covering all the security instruments as well as the three dimensions of CMR: control, 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
2. Chapter III: Incentives and Challenges in the Use of PMCs 
As mentioned above, the main reasons for the rise of PMCs are the political 
instability that emerged after the end of the Cold War, the diminished interests of 
superpowers in politically unstable areas, and the extensive downsizing of national 
militaries. However, there must be incentives for states to use PMCs rather than public 
armed forces. From realists’ perspectives, incentives create choices.  
My main argument in this chapter will be that the incentives of states, in the use 
of PMCs, differ according to the type of the state; strong state or weak state. I classify 
states as strong and weak by looking at their capabilities. Strong states have four main 
incentives. 
(1)  PMCs are perceived as cost-efficient, 
(2)  PMCs are flexible and can be deployed in theater rapidly, 
(3)  PMCs increase the effectiveness of public armed forces by decreasing 
their task burden, 
(4)  PMCs are effective tools for escaping political pressures. 
As for the weak states, their incentives are not related with effectiveness or 
efficiency. Often, PMCs are the only options of weak states due to the absence of strong 
                                                 
39 Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military-
Relations,” 909. 
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militaries and political restrictions imposed by international organizations. Furthermore, 
in some cases, such as the Iraq War, PMCs were used without the consent of weak states. 
As with incentives, the types and degree of challenges PMCs imposed on states 
are not the same due to the differences in the capacities of state institutions and armed 
forces. Weak states are faced with more crucial problems than strong states. Moreover, 
strong states need mainly political will for overcoming the problems related to the realm 
of PMCs. However, weak states need more than just political will. In the chapter, I will 
examine the main challenges of strong states and weak states in the use of PMCs. 
3. Chapter IV: Case Study—Private Military Companies in Iraq 
The Iraq War and its reconstruction efforts are the most recent example for the 
extensive use of PMCs. Because of extensive use in Iraq, the problems have become 
more visible than before. In this chapter, I will present the main challenges for the U.S. as 
a strong state and for Iraq as a weak state. 
The main challenges for the U.S. are:  
(1)  A decreasing international reputation due to the immunity of PMCs in 
Iraq. 
(2)  The unclear definition of “Inherently Governmental Functions” and non-
transparent nature of private military contracts harm the legitimacy of 
outsourcing military functions, and in turn, this harms the values of 
democracy.  
(3)  Wasting of taxpayers’ dollars due to uncompetitive contracting and cost-
reimbursement contracts and also due to insufficient oversight on 
contracts. 
(4)  Negative effects on military functions due to the unreliability of PMCs. 
As for Iraq, the main challenges are related to the survival of democratic Iraq. 
These are: 
(1)  PMCs (especially operational functions) impose an important threat to the 
sovereignty of Iraq. 
(2)  The use of PMCs will be an obstacle in the development progress of Iraqi 
Security forces (ISF). 
(3)  PMCs may be a good opportunity for ethnic groups to be armed. And this, 
in turn, may create a security dilemma between the factions. 
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4. Chapter V: Options for Regulating PMCs 
In the literature, we can find several alleged solutions for regulating PMCs. They 
range from a complete ban on PMCs’ activities to the self-regulation of the PMI. It is 
obvious that while self-regulation of the industry is advocated by some of its proponents, 
a complete ban of PMCs’ functions is seen as the best solution by some of their 
opponents. My first argument in this chapter is that neither self-regulation nor a complete 
ban can be a solution for the regulation of PMCs. They are so integrated into the military 
operations of states (especially strong states), that such states cannot give up using PMCs 
without experiencing significant difficulties. Also, we can say that PMI has had a self-
regulating system for decades due to the absence of an alternative regulatory system. If it 
has been working, why fix it? Thus, these two extreme alternatives cannot be right 
answers to the question: which system is best for regulating PMCs? 
My answer for this question is that a registration and licensing system that is 
supported by national laws can be effective for all types of states. However, specific 
characteristics of a system must be different according to the types of states (strong or 
weak). Moreover, national regulations cannot be sufficient without international support 
because of the transnational nature of the PMI. An international institution under the 
command of an international organization must be established. The main activity of this 
institution should be to serve as a guide for all states on regulating and contracting.  
Moreover, international laws must support the regulation systems by organizing juridical 
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II. PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES AND THEORIES OF 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Security of a state is very important to the extent that when we apply Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs to the states, it takes first priority. Unless a state can provide its own 
security, discussing other issues, such as development, is impossible. The military has 
been the instrument to meet this important need of states for centuries. However, the 
military is not the only security instrument of states. As stated by Bruneau and Matei, 
police forces, which sometimes perform military-like missions, and intelligence agencies 
are the other security instruments of states.40 Also, PMCs, the main interest of this 
research, must be considered as alternative security providers for states. 
Security forces are not only important in wartime, but also in peacetime, for 
providing security for their society. Moreover, they are the instruments for reaching 
national interests in the international arena by implementing violence or by posing a 
threat to opponents.  
As an area of political science, CMR often focuses on the military, but not on the 
other security forces. Because of the huge capacity of the military for implementing 
violence, it is perceived as the most important threat for democracy by scholars of CMR 
such as Huntington, Janowitz and Feaver. For example, Feaver states that “The civil-
military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask 
them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to 
do.”41 Thus, besides external security, the leaders of democratic states have another 
concern. It is to establish democratic civilian control over military forces. However, in 
the CMR realm, threats to civilian governments by the military should not be the only 
concern. As stated by Bruneau and Matei, “Democracies should consider control over all 
                                                 
40 Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military-
Relations,”  909. 
41 Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), 149. 
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instruments of security in implementing the spectrum of roles and missions.”42 And 
examining “what security forces do, and at what cost, that is, their effectiveness and 
efficiency, and the implications of their roles and missions for democracy” is also an 
important issue for civil-military relations.43 So, the classic question is: how can effective 
and stable relations between government and security forces be established? 
CMR is an area of political science that seeks a satisfying answer for this 
question. As mentioned above, scholars have generally tried to establish a theory that can 
be used by states to establish a military institution that is effective and also subordinate to 
civilian leaders. In this chapter, I will examine some of these theories of civil-military 
relations. The main purpose of this examination is to evaluate whether the theories cover 
all of the security forces, especially PMCs, and which of them can be a guide to regulate 
PMCs. It is worth noting that a theory must be applicable to all cases regardless of the 
specific characteristics of the cases. In other words, if a theory cannot answer the main 
questions in a case, this means that it is not sufficient. 
In the first section, I will examine the “objective civilian control” of Samuel 
Huntington, which is still influential today. According to this theory, an autonomous 
apolitical military is the only solution. In other words, his answer for the question of 
CMR is “objective civilian control” that can be achieved by militarizing the military. In 
the same section, I will also review the theory of Janowitz who used “professionalism” 
like Huntington. But his solution is quite different: civilianizing the military. In the 
second section, I will review “inter-service rivalry” and in the third section “threat-
mission based control.” In the fourth section, I will examine the “principal-agent” theory 
of Peter Feaver. Indeed, as he noted, this is not a theory but a framework that draws the 
structure of the relations between security forces and government.44 As for the fifth 
section, I will examine “new institutionalism,” which is very useful for defining the  
 
                                                 
42 Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military-
Relations,” 916. 
43 Ibid., 909. 
44 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 54. 
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problems and offering solutions for stable civil-military relations. And finally, I will 
conclude this chapter with a section in which regulation of PMCs will be evaluated with 
regard to these theories.  
A. MILITARIZING OR CIVILIANIZING MILITARY 
“Objective civilian control,” which was presented by Samuel Huntington, is 
among the most influential theories of CMR. In “The Soldier and the State,” written in 
1957, Samuel Huntington claims that democratic states can establish the critical balance 
that is a military strong enough against external threats, but weak relative to civilian 
leaders, only by establishing “objective civilian control.”45 Objective civilian control 
means full subordination of the military to the state. In other words, it makes the military 
a tool of the state. The antithesis of “objective civilian control,” according to Huntington, 
is “subjective civilian control.”46 Unlike the former, the latter means the subordination of 
the military to a specific civilian group or groups. Huntington argues that subjective 
civilian control is the tool of a civil group to get more power among the other civil 
groups. For example, he reviews the struggle for power between parliament and the 
crown in England and America of the seventeenth century. He describes the control of 
the military by crown as a subjective civilian control. Also he defines Parliament’s 
attempt to increase its control over the military as a struggle for power between the two 
civilian sides.47  
According to Huntington, objective civilian control can only be established by 
recognizing an autonomous, politically neutral and sterile military. He says that the way 
to achieve this is by professionalizing the military.48 He saw officership as a profession 
like any other profession, such as lawyers or doctors. He presented three fundamental 
elements to define profession: expertise, responsibility and corporateness. According to 
him, the expertise of officers, in general terms, is the management of violence with the 
                                                 
45 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 83–85. 
46 Ibid., 83. 
47 Ibid., 81. 
48 Ibid., 83, 84. 
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responsibility to protect society. As for the corporate character of officership, being an 
officer requires special training and education. Moreover, the corporate structure of the 
military profession includes military schools, journals, associations, traditions and 
customs.49 In sum, according to the theory, military professionalism leads to an 
autonomous, apolitical military and this, in turn, this leads to objective civilian control 
which means military subordination to elected civilian leaders. 
Morris Janowitz interpreted military professionalism differently. He presented the 
constabulary concept that reflects the changing nature of the military profession. He 
argues that the difference between peacetime and wartime concepts has disappeared. The 
military profession not only requires conventional warfare skills, but also skills in limited 
warfare, police functions, a combination of managerial/technical skills and the ability to 
understand international affairs.50 Moreover, he saw the military profession as being 
integrated into society due to sharing of common values.51 Janowitz, unlike Huntington, 
argues that subordination of the military requires education in politics. This does not 
mean a political military. He states that the goal of political education is “to develop a 
commitment to the democratic system and an understanding of how it works.”52 
According to Janowitz, by gaining knowledge of politics, military officers become 
“subject to civilian control not only because of the rule of law and tradition, but also 
because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration of civilian 
values.”53 In sum, Janowitz, contrary to Huntington’s idea of militarizing the military, 
supports the idea of civilianizing the military. 
 Although the two scholars presented different portraits of the military profession, 
the ways of establishing civilian control over a military are similar: self-subordination of 
military to civilian leaders. According to Huntington, this is possible by an autonomous, 
politically sterile military, but according to Janowitz it is only possible by a military that 
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51 Ibid., 440. 
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is integrated into society and aware of political affairs. Although the two theories brought 
strong insights into the political science and they are still influential, they are not perfect. 
They have fundamental weaknesses.   
First of all, they presented their ideas only by considering American civil-military 
relations. If they are correct in their ideas, it is not wrong to say that the militaries of 
states in which coups were seen were not professional. Otherwise, their theories cannot 
be applicable to all cases. Second, their approaches to the “civil-military 
problematique”54 are one-sided. As stated by James Burk, while Huntington mainly 
focused on the physical protection of the society or democratic state, Janowitz only 
focused on sustaining democratic values.55 Huntington gave most of his attention to the 
physical security of the state to the extent that he saw the weakening of liberalism as the 
requisite for military security.56 Third, they do not cover the current CMR. As argued by 
Burk, the current scope of CMR has gained a transnational nature.57 But both of the 
theories deal with only the internal matters of CMR. Fourth, neither of the theories 
include the external control mechanisms. Both of them supposed the self-imposed 
subordination of the military. However, as stated by Feaver, a comprehensive CMR 
theory must include external control mechanisms.58 Finally, the other dimensions of 
CMR, effectiveness and efficiency of the military, and the other security instruments such 
as PMCs, which are very related to the current CMR have not been considered by these 
two theories. 
B. INTERSERVICE RIVALRY THEORY 
Interservice rivalry theory is based on the organizational structure of the military. 
The theory presents a simple formula on the control over military; divide and control. 
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Interservice rivalry theory tells about the transformation of the conflict from the civil-
military level to the service-service level. As stated by Huntington, the conflicts in the 
organization itself moderate the conflicts between organizations.59 Moreover, Huntington 
argues that “American civil-military relations in the postwar decade, however, were 
characterized by the relative lack of sharp conflict between a united military 
establishment and either the State Department or Budget Bureau.”60  
Besides its positive impact on CMR, there are important side effects of 
interservice rivalry. James R. Locher stated these side effects accurately. He saw 
interservice rivalry as the main cause of failures in the Vietnam War, the seizure of USS 
Pueblo, the seizure of the Mayaguez, the failed Iranian rescue mission, the Marine 
barracks bombing in Beirut and the Grenada Incursion. According to Locher, interservice 
rivalry caused three main problems for operations: “poor military advice to political 
leaders, lack of unity of command and inability to operate jointly.”61 Interservice rivalry 
causes a huge isolation of military services from each other. And the severe competition 
between them, in order to get more power on decision-making processes and to get more 
money from the defense budget, separate them and thus cause poor performance in the 
battlefield. For example, “Colonel James Kyle, U.S. Air Force, who was the senior 
commander at Desert One, would recall that there were ‘four commanders at the scene 
without visible identification, incompatible radios, and no agreed-upon plan, not even a 
designated location for the commander.’"62 Moreover, inefficiency in defense 
procurement is another side effect of interservice rivalry. For example, as stated by 
Locher, the Department of Defense suffered from inefficiency because “communications, 
refueling, and other vital systems and devices were not interoperable across the 
services.”63 
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Interservice rivalry theory provides too narrow viewpoint to civil-military 
relations. It focuses only on the control dimension of civil-military relations. It changes 
the level of conflicts, but does not solve them. The effectiveness and efficiency of 
military organizations are not issues of this theory. In fact, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the military are affected negatively by interservice rivalry at the price of 
control over military organizations. Furthermore, similar to the theories of Huntington 
and Janowitz, interservice rivalry does not cover the transnational nature of the civil-
military tensions. 
C. THREAT-MISSION BASED CONTROL OVER MILITARY 
Threat based theory is one of the alternative civil-military relation theories. 
Michael C. Desch presented the theory by including the external factors of a state as well 
as internal factors. In fact, he considers four main internal factors (individual leaders, 
military organizations, state structures and societies) as intervening variables and threat 
(in two types: external and internal) as independent variables. He examines the strength 
of CMR as outcomes of the responses of intervening factors to the types and levels of 
threat.64 He divides threat environment into four categories according to the levels of 
external and internal threats.  
 
   
 
Poor (Q3) Worst (Q4) 
Good (Q1) Mixed (Q2) 
Figure 1.   Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of 
Threats (From Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military) 
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According to his theory, the responses of intervening variables are predictable in 
the first and fourth categories. In the first category, high external threat leads to a unified 
outward-oriented military, a unified society, experienced leaders, convergent ideas in 
society and finally “objective” civilian control. He defines civil-military relations in this 
category as the most stable one. In the fourth category, high internal threat leads to 
inexperienced leaders, divided society and divergent ideas, a unified but internal-oriented 
military and “subjective” civilian control. He defines the civil-military relations in this 
category as the worst one.65 Although it is logical that high external threats lead to a 
united society and an outward-oriented military, it is not clear that how it provides 
experienced civilian leaders. Moreover, one may ask the questions: What if military 
leaders gather too much political power in the case of a high external threat? Which 
mechanism can guarantee democratic control over the military? 
As for the second and third categories, the responses of intervening variables and 
outcomes are not clear. At this point, the importance of mission or military doctrine 
comes into play. According to Desch, “internally oriented militaries should be harder to 
control than externally oriented militaries.”66 In other words, assigning external missions 
to militaries makes the control much easier. Desch’s theory brings a different insight into 
the civil-military relations realm, but it cannot answer some of the questions, such as how 
can democratic control over military be established when the level of external threat is 
low? Which mechanisms can protect stable civil-military relations? How can an effective 
military be established without decreasing democratic civilian control? Furthermore, the 
other security instruments of state are not the subject of this theory. Therefore, the theory 
is not sufficient to be a guide for states in their relations with security forces. 
Paul Shemella supported Desch as stated that “…civilian leaders, with 
professional military advice, must ensure that the roles and missions of their armed forces 
remain legitimate and wherever possible, externally focused.”67 According to Shemella 
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the roles of military, which he defines as “warfighter,” “defender” and “peacemaker” are 
the more suitable roles for effective civil-military relations than “fire fighter” and “police 
officer” roles, which focus on internal conflicts.68  
Contrary to Desch, Shemella gives a prescription for the effective control over the 
military. He states, “Institutional mechanisms for democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces are an indispensible tool that governments use to avoid falling into the 
troublemaker69 category.”70  
D. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
The principal-agent theory of CMR aimed to explain the main problems of 
interaction between civilians and military leaders. The theories, explained above, could 
not even define the exact problems of current CMR. Peter Feaver recognized that in the 
United States (in fact, in mature democracies) the danger of a military coup is almost 
nonexistent. He defines the main issue of civil-military relations as whether the military 
is directed by civilian leaders. According to him, the main problem of CMR in mature 
democracies is a military that is “shirking.” Feaver used the term “shirking” to refer to 
activities of militaries that are contrary to the “functional goal”71 or the “relational goal” 
of civilians. Functional goal includes whether the military is doing what civilians asked it 
to do in the style that civilians directed, whether the military is using its full capacity to 
implement the civilians’ orders and whether the military is capable of implementing its 
tasks. As for the relational goal, it includes whether key policy decisions belong to 
civilians or the military, whether civilians decide which decisions should be given by the 
military, and whether the military is avoiding any action that may undermine civilian 
supremacy.72 
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Principal-agent theory is based on the delegation of an authority from a principal 
to an agent. In other words, it is a relationship in which agents use an authority on behalf 
of their principals. According to Feaver, contracts are the main tools for establishing a 
principal-agent relationship.73 Thus, in regard to CMR, governments delegate the 
authority of the use of force to the military that is an agency of government by a social 
contract. 
Feaver presents some features (or problems) that have important influences on 
principal-agent relationships. First of all, there is information asymmetry between 
principal and agent. In CMR, the advantage of information is on the side of the 
military.74 As stated by Feaver, in the case of operations and war, the information 
asymmetry increases in favor of the military because of difficulties in monitoring.75 
Moreover, secrecy restrictions that are common in defense matters reinforce the tendency 
of the military to hide information.76 Information asymmetry provides the military an 
important power to pursue its own institutional interests. 
Second, adverse selection is one of the main problems of principal-agency 
relations. According to Feaver, adverse selection is the uncertainty of principal about the 
capability and qualifications of its agents.77 He says that “It also refers to the fact that the 
very act of hiring creates perverse incentives for the agent to misrepresent itself, which 
thereby increases the chances that the principal will hire a lout: it is hard to verify the true 
type and a lout has a great incentive to appear even more attractive than a good 
worker.”78  
The final one is the moral hazard. In Feaver’s words, “moral hazard refers at a 
general level to the problem that principals cannot completely observe the true behavior 
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of the agent and so cannot be certain whether the agent is working or shirking.”79 As 
stated by Feaver, agents or employees have incentives to do less, if they can get paid the 
same amount for doing so.80 
Moreover, Feaver presented two main requirements to prevent the military from 
shirking: monitoring mechanisms and punishment mechanisms. He states that “Civilians 
still have means available with which to direct the military and thereby mitigate the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in delegation. In essence, control 
or monitoring mechanisms are ways of overcoming the information problems…perhaps 
by getting the agent to reveal information or perhaps by adjusting the incentives of the 
agent so that the principal can ‘know’ that the agent wants what the principal wants.”81 
He makes a list of monitoring mechanisms: contract incentives, screening and selection, 
fire alarms, institutional checks, policy patrols and revising delegation decision.82 As for 
the punishment mechanisms, they are restrictive monitoring, current and future material 
disincentives, the military justice system and extralegal action such as verbal rebukes.83 
Feaver provides a powerful insight into the CMR realm. His theory explains the 
main structure and tensions of CMR, especially for mature democracies. Moreover, this 
structure is applicable to the relations between government and other security 
instruments. Feaver also recognizes the importance of external mechanisms to make the 
military subordinate to civilians. However, there is an important problem. Monitoring and 
punishment mechanisms are too static and they are not applicable to all of the security 
agents. Moreover, these control mechanisms may not be useful in all countries. Different 
characteristics of states and security agents require different control mechanisms. 
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E. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
In broad terms, new institutionalism is an approach that seeks to explain the 
effects of institutions on the behavior of individuals and organizations in an environment. 
It has sub-theories that “all seek to elucidate the role that institutions play in the 
determination of social and political outcomes.”84 Institutions, as defined by Hall and 
Taylor, are “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in organizational structure of the polity or political economy.”85 In fact, 
institutions’ common purpose is to shape the relations between actors in an environment. 
In other words, institutions are created in order to arrange power relations in a society. As 
stated by Bruneau, “creating and implementing institutions is all about power, and 
institutional power relations therefore are a primary concern of New Institutionalism.”86 
In a democratic state, different bureaucratic organizations are in power 
relationships that are organized by institutions in order to direct organizations to an 
overarching goal: effectiveness and efficiency in functions of the state as a whole, while 
protecting the values of democracy. Here the subjects of New Institutionalism are how 
these institutions can shape these power relations, how and why a specific institution is 
created, what are the specific characteristics and power of an institution to achieve its 
goal, whether an institution fits to a society, and what are the unintended consequences of 
creating an institution.  
 The scholars of CMR must seek to arrange the relations between security 
instruments and civilian leaders in order to achieve two goals: effectiveness and 
efficiency of security instruments and to protect the values of democracy. Civilian control 
over the military, the only interest of old theories, cannot be the only purpose of civil-
military relations. Moreover, as noted by James Burke, the scope of civil-military 
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relations has changed and it gains a transnational nature.87 From the perspective of New 
Institutionalism, this means that CMR should also examine the effects of foreign and 
international institutions as well as the relations between security forces and foreign and 
international organizations. 
It is important to recognize that the effects of the same institution on the power 
relations of organizations change from state to state. Cultural, sociological and structural 
differences cause different reflections of organizations to an institution in different 
countries. Thus, the main issue for the analysts of CMR should be defining the negative 
and positive effects of institutions in a specific country and seeking ways to eliminate the 
negative effects, or examining alternative institutions that are more suitable to that 
country. 
New Institutionalism’s approach in studying CMR has useful features. First of all, 
we can apply the approach for all types of security instruments and for both levels of 
relations (national and international). Moreover, it provides flexibility, which is very 
useful in regard to the changing characteristics of countries, security instruments, and 
specific roles and missions. 
F. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
AND THE THEORIES 
As alternative security providers for states, PMCs are indispensible elements of 
CMR. Their impacts on effectiveness and efficiency on the battlefield have been 
significant since the end of the Cold War.  The main purpose of this section is to find out 
which theory or theories can explain and present solutions for the relations between 
PMCs and the state. In order to determine the most suitable approach for PMCs, we 
should examine the theories explained above from the aspect of PMCs. 
First, the theories of Huntington and Janowitz are not applicable to PMCs. The 
main reason for this conclusion is that private security is not a profession as they argued 
for the military. Huntington argues that military officers’ responsibility for protecting 
society is an important feature of military professionalism. According to him, there is no 
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monetary motivation for officership, especially in western countries. But for a private 
military contractor the private gain (monetary) is the only incentive and to talk about a 
responsibility for protecting society is almost impossible. Moreover, Huntington 
intentionally eliminated private security actors from his theory by stating that “the officer 
is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he 
the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with 
no steadying and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence.”88 
Huntington and Janowitz argue that subordination of the military to the civilian 
government is provided by military officers voluntarily. Since private gain is the main 
incentive for PMCs, the possibility of voluntary subordination is extremely low. Thus, 
PMCs cannot be considered in these theories. 
Second, interservice rivalry is not a promising theory for PMCs. The competition 
between PMCs for future contracts may be interpreted as an interservice rivalry. In fact, 
this competition is a natural characteristic of the private business sector. The competition 
has useful effects in the selection process, such as a tool for minimizing costs. Although 
inter service rivalry brings some useful insights to the issue, it is not comprehensive 
enough to explain all aspects of the challenges that PMCs pose. It is worth noting that to 
think of interservice rivalry as a monitoring and fire alarm system, rather than as a theory, 
is more useful. 
Third, the threat and mission-based theory is complicated when applied to PMCs. 
Since PMCs are not permanent standing armies of state, the type of threat is not so 
important. PMCs are hired when they are needed. Of course, there are differences 
between using PMCs in the home country and using them abroad. However, to argue that 
the external or internal-oriented use of PMCs makes the relations more stable does not 
sound logical. As mentioned in the first chapter, PMCs provide various types of services 
ranging from logistical services to active combat services. Unlike the threat type, the 
mission type has important effects on the control of PMCs. For example, the control of 
active combat services is more difficult than of logistical services. Also, armed services 
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cause ambiguous legal situations for PMCs and states. However, this mission-type 
approach is not sufficient to explain the main requirements for a stable relation between 
PMCs and government, and between PMCs and the other security instruments. 
Fourth, the principal-agent theory of Peter Feaver provides a powerful structure 
that is applicable to PMCs. In fact, it is more suitable for PMCs than the military. As 
stated by Cockayne, contracting is one way to control PMCs by states that are 
principals.89 A state, as a principal, delegates some power to a PMC to implement a 
specific mission by a business-type contract. In other words, contracts are the starter for 
the principal-agent relationship. Information asymmetry does exist between PMCs and 
states for the same reasons as the military. As for the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, they are stronger in PMCs than in the military. The only reason for this 
conclusion is that private gain is the only incentive of PMCs. The main purpose of PMCs 
is to get a contract. The question is whether the fulfillment of the mission is important for 
PMCs or not. One may answer yes to this question in regard to the importance of saving 
future contracts, but what if an extremely dangerous situation emerges? In other words, 
what if the only incentive (private gain) loses its importance against physical survival? 
Moreover, do PMCs implement their missions in the direction that states want? Or do 
they implement their missions in the direction that provides the best private gain for 
them? While honor and patriotism are important incentives in the military, this is not 
necessarily the case for PMCs. Therefore, state-PMC relations are more vulnerable to the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. There is another important point for PMCs 
as security agents. States are not the only principals for them. Foreign governments, 
NGOs, private corporations and even individuals can be principals. This feature makes 
the control issue more controversial for states, especially for operations abroad. 
Monitoring and punishment systems are indispensible tools for regulating the actions of 
PMCs. But there are no universal mechanisms that are effective in every state. They  
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should be different because of the different characteristics of states, such as capacity, 
regime type and culture. But Feaver’s mechanisms are constant and not applicable to 
every state. 
At this point, the importance of New Institutionalism emerges. As explained 
above, institutions have influences on the actors. Thus, the behavior of PMCs can be 
regulated only by effective institutions. In PMCs case, there are two levels of institutions: 
national and international. While international institutions need to be sufficiently broad to 
cover the industry as a whole, national institutions need to be detailed and suitable for the 
specific characteristics of states. 
In sum, the principal agent theory and new institutionalism theory together will be 
the main guides for the rest of the research as they provide more powerful insights into 
the CMR, especially for PMCs. In the next chapter, the challenges of using PMCs will be 









III. INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES IN THE USE OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY COMPANIES 
In the first chapter, I stated the broad reason for the increase of PMCs: the 
downsizing of military forces and the increase in the number of conflicts due to the 
power vacuum after the end of the Cold War. We should examine the tendency for using 
PMCs in detail in order to understand the challenges for states. In fact, the challenges that 
states are facing change from state to state.  In order to generalize the incentives and the 
challenges, I will use two classifications of states. The first classification is related with 
the capability of states: weak states and strong states. By weak states, I mean the states 
that do not have effective government institutions and armed forces and that are in 
conflict. By strong states, I mean the states that have developed governmental 
institutions, strong armed forces and a stable internal order. The second classification is 
related to the position of states in regards to using PMCs: home state, principal state and 
territorial state. The home state of a PMC is the state in which the PMC is based. The 
principal state of a PMC is the state that outsources some kind of military functions to 
that PMC as a security agency. As for the territorial state, it is the state in which a PMC is 
operating. Here, the important point is the home states and principal states hold some 
kind of control in their hands. Thus, they play active roles in regard to relations with 
PMCs. As for the territorial state role, it is a passive role, and these states have no control 
right over PMCs. 
It is also important to note that states may have one or more roles in their relations 
with PMCs. Which roles a state may have depends on the type of state (strong or weak). 
Table 1 presents four combinations of state roles and shows the place of two types of 
states (strong and weak) in these combinations. As presented in the table, strong states 
always have at least one of two active roles in relations with PMCs (home state role, 
principal state role). This provides them some kind of control right over PMCs. They may 
also have territorial state roles as in the first combination. Here, the important point is 
that when they have territorial roles, they have both of the active roles as well. Thus, they 
hold all the control right in their hands when their territory is at issue. As for weak states, 
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in all combinations they have territorial roles. In combinations three and four they have 
one of two active roles, thus they have no absolute control right over PMCs. The most 
dangerous and the most common one is combination two in which weak states have to 

















Combination 2 Strong State 
Strong 




U.S.  in Iraq 
Combination 3 Strong State Weak State Weak State 
U.S. PMCs 
operating for 
Iraq in Iraqi 
territory 
Combination 4 Weak State Strong State Weak State 
Iraqi PMCs 
operating for 
U.S. in Iraq 
Table 1.   Combination of State Roles 
Another important point in the classification of roles is that a principal role may 
be played by non-state actors such as international organizations or private corporations. 
For example, in Iraq, we can see lots of private reconstruction firms that are hiring 
private security companies to provide security to their employees. 
Now the question is: What are the effects of these roles on the states in regards to 
the challenges of using PMCs? Before answering this question, I will examine the 
incentives of states for using private military industry. 
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A. THE INCENTIVES OF STATES 
The general dictionary meaning of “incentive” is “a thing that motivates or 
encourages one to do something.”90 In this research, I will use the term meaning the 
reasons why states are using PMCs. Incentives of states differ according to the type of 
states. Thus, I will examine the incentives under two subsections. 
1.  The Incentives of Strong States 
Strong states such as the United States have different types of security tools that 
have already proven their capabilities. So, while having capable security institutions, why 
do strong states choose to hire PMCs to do security-related tasks? Deborah C. Kidwell 
answered this question by stating, “Supporting regular forces with PMCs has the 
potential to be cost efficient, to be politically expedient, and to enhance military 
effectiveness and national security.”91 
First of all, PMCs seem to be cost effective. Even though the contractors’ incomes 
may seem much higher than regular soldiers, they are paid for a specific time. In other 
words, unlike standing military, they are hired when they are needed. On the other hand, 
PMCs operate a smaller number of personnel than militaries. This is another factor that 
creates a perception that PMCs are cheaper. Jared F. Lawyer compared the costs of the 
Executive Outcome and the costs of the United Nations Peacekeeping (UNPK) forces in 
the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone. According to his study, the total cost of UNPK 
forces in Angola was $626 million.92 As for the Executive Outcomes, its total cost for the 
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estimated that if military support functions could be privatized, $30 billion could be 
saved by 2002.93  According to these numbers, hiring PMCs may be extremely beneficial  
in material terms. 
The second incentive for strong states is that PMCs enhance the effectiveness of 
regular militaries. There are two main reasons for this argument. First, as stated by 
Schreier and Caparini, PMCs free up military personnel by implementing non-operational 
military functions such as logistics, and providing protective functions in conflict areas.94 
Thus, the military can focus on its core tasks, which are operational military functions. 
Second, as stated by the Defense Science Board, more dollars, which can be saved by the 
privatization of military support functions, can be invested in combat effectiveness and 
modernization.95 
Third, as stated by Schreier and Caparini, PMCs are generally more flexible, and 
in emergency cases they are more suitable for rapid mobilization and deployments.96 
While regular militaries have to train soldiers for different situations, PMCs choose their 
employees, who are already trained in public forces, according to their training and 
experiences. Thus, PMCs have the potential to make important contributions to national 
and international security by mobilizing on short notice and offering states a “surge 
capacity.”97 
Fourth, as argued by Kidwell, “… contractors can offer additional political 
advantages (regardless of cost) to their clients.” 98 PMCs decrease the number of regular 
forces in theater. As a result, as stated by Schreier and Caparini, the political pressures 
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associated with sending armed forces into unstable areas are decreased by using PMCs.99 
Moreover, casualties of individual private contractors are often not counted among the 
total casualties. In addition, “casualties among PMC employees wouldn’t cause the same 
political problems that the deaths of a country’s armed forces do.”100 In fact, it is not 
wrong to say that this political reason is an incentive of governments rather than states as 
a whole. 
2. The Incentives of Weak States 
The roles of weak states (home/principal/territorial roles) in the cases of 
interaction with PMCs will be helpful to explain the incentives of weak states. As 
explained above, weak states are always territorial states without having all of the 
control. They may have all of the three roles only in the first combination (see Table 1), 
which is rare for a weak state. Therefore, being a territorial state without having control is 
an indicator of the weakness of the state. 
It is important to note that strong states have the right to choose hiring PMCs or 
not. As for the weak states, this is not a matter of choice, because they have no resources 
to build effective armed forces and other state institutions. Moreover, they cannot do that 
due to other reasons such as high levels of corruption or internal political conflicts. 
Because of the absence of militaries or effective militaries, their incentive for using 
PMCs is only about survival. For example, in the cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, Croatia 
or Bosnia, the incentives of those states are not cost effectiveness or decreasing political 
pressures, but only the survival of the state itself. Moreover, in other cases, such as Iraq, 
the consent of weak states for using PMCs in their territories may have no importance.  
Therefore, there is only one incentive for weak states: survival. While weak 
states’ incentive is a fundamental one, the incentives of strong states are secondary 
relative to weak states’ incentives. In sum, the use of PMCs by weak states is not by 
choice, but by necessity. 
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B. THE CHALLENGES 
The extensive use of PMCs brought important concerns such as to whether they 
are mercenary or not. Are they more effective and more efficient than the military? Are 
they legal entities? Are they beneficial or harmful to states? There is no clear answer to 
these questions. In fact, the answers depend on international and national institutions. If 
they are effective, PMCs can be useful, but otherwise they may cause severe problems. It 
is important to state that, like incentives the challenges that PMCs pose are different from 
state to state. In fact, they are more acute for weak states than for strong states. 
1. Sovereignty and State Monopoly of Violence 
As stated by Newell and Sheehy, there is a “belief that states should have a 
monopoly over the use of violence.”101 They define two functions of a state’s monopoly 
over violence. First, it justifies the state sovereignty, and second, it is required to fulfill a 
state’s responsibility that is protecting its citizens. The question is whether PMCs 
constitute a threat to a state’s monopoly over violence, and therefore, to a state’s 
sovereignty. In order to answer this question, we have to answer a sub-question. 
The sub-question is about the meaning of monopoly over violence. Is monopoly 
over violence a monopoly over the use of violence or a monopoly over the management 
of violence? The latter sounds more logical, because PMCs do not pose a threat to a 
state’s sovereignty when that state has the capability to control and mitigate them. So the 
answer depends on the capability of states. As stated by Newell and Sheehy, if a state is 
economically and institutionally strong, the risk of PMCs undermining its sovereignty is 
small.102 Therefore, in regard to a state’s sovereignty, weak states, which do not have 
capability to control PMCs, are more vulnerable. 
Moreover, the role of states in relation to PMCs has an important influence on the 
risk of losing sovereignty. Strong states are territorial states only when they have both the 
home state and principal state roles. In contrast, as I stated above, weak states are often 
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territorial states without having complete control. In most cases, PMCs are completely 
out of their control. This point clearly shows the different degrees of vulnerability of 
states. 
Furthermore, as stated by Holmqvist, PMCs can be hired by rebel groups or other 
non-state actors in weak states.103 These non-state actors can gain technological and 
operational advantages over a state’s forces, which can severely harm the sovereignty of 
a state. Therefore, weak states that have no strong institutions have more to lose in terms 
of sovereignty when PMCs operate in their territories.  
2. Legal Status and Accountability of Private Military Companies 
Laws, whether international or national, can be among the most important 
institutions to regulate people, organizations and their behaviors. The legal status and 
accountability of PMCs and their employees are the most controversial issues in the 
industry. It is often unclear whether they are mercenaries or not. Are they lawful 
combatants or not? Do they have the rights of prisoners of war? Are private security 
contractors accountable under any law? Can they be tried or prosecuted by any authority 
for their unlawful behaviors? Is there any legal responsibility of the managers of PMCs 
for their employees’ unlawful actions? 
In order to answer these questions, we have to look at current international and 
national laws.  
a. International Laws 
Looking at international laws, none define and regulate PMCs. However, 
three international conventions are related to mercenaries. 
(1)  Article 47 of Additional Protocol to Geneva Conventions (1977) 
(2)  The Convention of Organization of African Unity (OAU) for 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1985) 
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(3)  The United Nations International Convention Against the 
Recruitment, Use Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989) 
Article 47 of Additional Protocol to Geneva Conventions presents a 
definition of mercenaries: 
1.  A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war.  
2.  A mercenary is any person who:  
(a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
an armed conflict;  
(b)  Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c)  Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on 
behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed 
forces of that Party;  
(d)  Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
(e)  Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and  
(f)  Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
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Table 2.   An Evaluation of Contractors According to the Legal Definition of Mercenaries 
As mentioned by Millard, paragraph 1 of Article 47 “deprives mercenaries 
of the privilege to serve as lawful combatants and the immunity to be treated as prisoners 
of war upon capture.”106 However, it does not prohibit the actions of mercenaries. In 
addition, paragraph 2 presents six requirements (see Table 2) to define mercenaries. 
Schreier and Caparini stated that “all six requirements of paragraph 2 must be satisfied 
for the definition to be met. A failure to satisfy one requirement is sufficient to prevent 
the definition being met. This is also the fundamental weakness of the protocol.”107 Thus, 
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by definition, only third country nationals who take a direct part in conflicts may be 
called mercenaries. However, the convention does not define direct participation. In other 
words, it is not clear which actions should be considered direct participation. 
The Convention of OAU for Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
presents a definition of mercenaries similar to Article 47 of Additional Protocol of 
Geneva Conventions. Again, all of the conditions must be met to call a person a 
mercenary. But, contrary to Article 47 of Additional Protocol, it is the first attempt to 
criminalize mercenarism,108 stating: 
The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or 
association, representative of a State or the State itself who with the aim of 
opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination stability or the 
territorial integrity of another State, practices any of the following acts: 
a)  Shelters, organizes, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, 
supports or in any manner employs bands of mercenaries; 
b)  Enlists, enrolls or tries to enroll in the said bands; 
c)  Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out 
in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its 
control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations 
of the above mentioned forces. 
d)  Any person, natural or juridical who commits the crime of 
mercenarism as defined in paragraph 1  of this Article commits an 
Offence considered as a crime against peace and security in Africa 
and shall be punished as such.109 
As noted by Goddard, this convention makes an important effort “as it 
seeks to legislate against mercenary activity, outlining responsibilities and obligations of 
member nation-states towards the prohibition, prevention, and judicial prosecution of 
mercenary related military actions.”110 However, it has some weaknesses. Schreier and 
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Caparini state these weaknesses. “The Convention does not cover the activities of PMCs, 
nor does it include corporate criminal responsibility, which may emerge as a crucial 
aspect of controlling PMC activities. Applicability is not universal, but limited to member 
states within the OAU and to those member states that have signed and ratified the 
convention….Although in force since 1985; the Convention has rarely been enforced.”111  
Another international attempt to regulate mercenarism is the U.N. 
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries. According to Schreier and Caparini, it is a good attempt at seeking “to 
prohibit and, to that end, establish as punishable offences, the recruitment, use, financing 
and training of mercenaries. Moreover, it requires that the state, in which the alleged 
offender is found, must exercise universal criminal jurisdiction or extradite the alleged 
offender to another state.”112 However, it repeats the definition of Additional Protocol 1 
of the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, Schreier and Caparini stated that “the scope of the 
convention only extends to the country where the mercenary activity has taken place, 
which means that it is difficult for states to take measures against other states acting in 
breach of the Convention. There is also no monitoring or enforcement mechanism, so the 
application relies on individual member states.”113 Furthermore, strong states, which use 
PMCs intensely, are not among the parties of the convention.114 
If employees of PMCs are not mercenaries, what is their legal status? It is 
worth paying attention to the explanation of the legal status of PMCs by Schreier and 
Caparini. They stated that “PMC employees are not ‘noncombatants,’ as unarmed 
contractors are under the 4th Geneva Convention because they carry weapons and act on 
behalf of the government. However, they are also not ‘lawful combatants’ under the 3rd 
Geneva Convention because they do not wear regular uniforms or answer to a military 
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command hierarchy.”115 According to Schreier and Caparini, “They seem to fall into the 
same gray area as the unlawful combatants detained as suspected terrorists at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”116 
In sum, the legal definition of mercenaries in international law is unclear 
and not sufficient to apply for private military contractors. My intention is not to show 
that PMCs are mercenaries or to say they should not be used. Whether they are 
mercenaries or not, they must be defined clearly. Otherwise, like the current situation, 
they are neither unlawful, nor can they be regulated for their criminal actions.  
Moreover, there is a recent attempt at the international level to define and 
regulate PMCs. It is the Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and 
Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies, which was written by a working 
group in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. It defined the industry 
stating “A Private Military and/or Security Company (PMSC) is a corporate entity which 
provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security services, including 
investigation services, by physical persons and/or legal entities.”117 As stated by Jennifer 
K. Elsea, “The draft convention emphasizes that states should have an effective 
monopoly on the use of force, and that states are responsible under international law for 
their use of force whether on their own territory or beyond, and whether conducted by 
national armed forces or private armed groups operating under the state’s license or 
contract.”118 The draft convention would require states to establish their own regulatory 
systems and prohibit some activities of PMCs such as direct participation in armed 
conflicts, terrorist acts, violating territorial sovereignties of other states.119 However, the 
draft convention accepts the usual definition of mercenaries by stating that “Each State 
Party which has not yet done so shall consider ratifying the International Convention 
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against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.”120 Thus, it does 
not bring a strong insight to differentiate PMCs’ employees and mercenaries. Moreover it 
is a draft document and not effective until signed and ratified by states. Therefore, 
international laws are lacking in regulating PMCs. The next step is looking at national 
laws. 
b. National Laws 
As mentioned above, there are some anti-mercenary international laws. 
However, they are not applicable to PMCs and their employees. Because of the 
insufficiency of international law, national laws must be considered. As stated by Singer, 
“for most of the world’s governments, though, there are simply no applicable laws that 
regulate and define the jurisdictions under which PMFs operate.”121  There are just two 
countries that have important national legislation that intend to regulate PMCs: South 
Africa and the United States. Unfortunately, these national laws are not effective for 
resolving the legal problems that surround PMCs. 
According to Schreier and Caparini, South Africa’s Foreign Military 
Assistance Act is “the most far-reaching national legislation dealing with mercenaries, 
PMCs and PSCs.”122 As stated by Goddard, “Under its provisions and due enforcement 
by South African Law, the act sought to compel organizations, to seek government 
authorization for each contract with a foreign government.”123 It says: 
(iii)  foreign military assistance means military services or military-
related services, or any attempt, encouragement, incitement or 
solicitation to render such services, in the form of- 
(a)  military assistance to a party to the armed conflict by means of- 
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(i)  advice or training, 
(ii)  personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support; 
(iii)  Personnel recruitment; 
(iv)  medical or para-medical services; 
(v)  procurement of equipment 
(b)  security services for the protection of individuals involved in 
armed conflict or their property, 
(c)  any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining 
the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a 
state. 
(d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military 
interests of a party to the armed conflict, but not humanitarian or 
civilian activities aimed at relieving the plight of civilians in an 
area of armed conflict; 
(iv)  mercenary activity means direct participation as a combatant in 
armed conflict for private gain; 
(vi)  person means a natural person who is a citizen of or is permanently 
resident in the Republic, a juristic person registered or incorporated 
in the Republic, and any foreign citizen who contravenes any 
provision of this Act within the borders of the Republic; 
2.  No person may within the Republic or elsewhere recruit, use or 
train persons for or finance or engage in mercenary activity. 
3.  No person may within the Republic or elsewhere- 
(a)  offer to render any military assistance to any state or organ of state, 
group of persons or other entity or person unless he or she has been 
granted authorization to offer such assistance in terms of section 4; 
(b)  render any military assistance to any state or organ of state, group 
of persons or other entity or person unless such assistance is 
rendered in accordance with an agreement approved in terms of 
section 5.124 
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According to the Act, South Africa prohibits any kind of mercenary 
activity in its territory. Also, the act prohibits its own citizens from offering mercenary 
activities to foreign states unless permission is granted by the government. However, this 
act is not without problems. The main problem is its enforcement mechanism. As 
Schreier and Caparini emphasized, “While the legislation is a major step forward in both 
intent and word, the Iraq conflict has demonstrated the difficulty of enforcing these new 
regulations.”125 Some South African PMCs, such as Eryns and Meteoric Tactical 
Solutions, are operating in Iraq.126 Even though they have not gotten approval from their 
government, the South African government has not been able to enforce its regulation. 
Another problem is presented by Newell and Sheehy, who argued that foreign military 
assistance is defined too broadly and thus includes support activities, like humanitarian 
aid.127  
As for the United States, it has a licensing system to regulate PMCs. The 
U.S. Arms Export Control Act regulates arms brokering and the export of military-related 
services. As pointed out by Schreier and Caparini, “US companies offering military 
advice to foreign nationals in the US or overseas are required to register with, and obtain 
a license from, the US State Department under the International Transfer of Arms 
Regulations (ITAR), which implement the Arms Export Control Act.”128 The main 
purpose of this licensing system is to protect the national interests of the United States. 
However, the system does not provide an effective control over PMCs by itself. Criminal 
laws must be enacted to regulate PMCs’ actions abroad. Two Blackwater cases, 
especially, reveal the need for criminal laws for PMCs. Some literature mentions the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and the Uniform Code of Military Justice as 
options for trying and prosecuting private military contractors. These laws will be 
discussed in the fourth chapter.  
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As a result, PMCs are in a legal vacuum. This lawlessness affects weak 
states severely because protecting their own citizens, a fundamental responsibility of 
states, is at the hands of foreign states. In other words, the justice in weak states depends 
upon the willingness and national laws of the home states of PMCs. 
Of course, there are negative effects of this legal vacuum on strong states. 
It poses a threat to democratic values and the reputation of states in the international 
arena. As argued by Avant and Sigelman, extensive reliance on the private security 
market “has impeded constitutionalism and lowered transparency in the U.S.”129  
Moreover, a British Green Paper states that functions of the British PMCs affect Britain’s 
reputation because of the fact that people will assume some degree of the British 
Government’s approval on any activity of British PMCs.130 
3. The Effect on Public Armed Forces 
The effects of PMCs on armed forces depend on the type of missions that PMCs 
perform in a particular case. In fact, the types of missions are mainly related to the 
capabilities of public armed forces. In other words, the degree of strength of public forces 
determines the states’ decisions to use PMCs in missions from the tip to the end of the 
spear. I will use Dew’s and Hudgens’ classification of missions,131 which I explained in 
the first chapter. But, as I stated before, I will use the term “operational military 
functions” for “attack operations” in order to include defensive missions. 
a. Operational Functions 
Why do states need PMCs for the operational functions of armed forces? 
The answer is simple: insufficient armed forces. It is obvious that this is a feature of weak 
states. As stated by Holmqvist, PMCs that perform operational functions provide short-
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term benefits for states such as in the operations of Executive Outcomes and Sandline 
International in Sierra Leone.132 Even though Holmqvist only considered operational 
military functions, it is also true for protective functions. In order to reach long-term 
solutions, the building of capable public forces is indispensible.  
As noted by Holmqvist, PMCs that perform operational functions create 
“a false image of security in the short term, which distorts proper assessment of security 
needs.”133  In other words, states do not give enough attention to the improvement of 
public forces due to a false sense of security. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that the 
implementation of operational functions by PMCs poses a threat to the development of 
public forces.  
Moreover, by implementing operational functions, PMCs make weak 
public forces weaker by deteriorating the prestige of public forces in the eyes of the 
public. This, in turn, erodes the justification of armed forces for the existence that is 
among the main interests of armed forces. Thus, the implementation of operational 
functions by PMCs may be perceived by armed forces as a direct threat to their existence. 
This in turn poses a threat to civilian governments.  
b. Advice and Training Functions 
Even though providing advice and training for armed forces is perceived 
as a non-core military function in regard to the spear concept, they can be more 
influential for long-term stability if they can be implemented with careful planning. This 
is a difficult process, however, and can take a long time. 
Which states need PMCs for these functions? Unlike for operational 
functions, this time the answer is both weak and strong states. Even though weak states 
are in the majority in the use of PMCs for advice and training functions, strong states also 
use PMCs for specific training programs. But there is a difference between the two types 
of states. Strong states do not hire this type of services for making armed forces capable, 
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but for relieving the task burden of armed forces to focus on their operational functions. 
As for the armed forces of weak states, they need advice and training to be capable of 
doing operational functions. In most cases, advising on military issues is not limited to 
armed forces, but also consists of advising civilian officials. At this point, resentments 
among the officers of armed forces emerge. As stated by Schreier and Caparini, the 
resentments reach to their highest degree when the “officers of PMCs become 
preferential advisors for the government” and “are placed in higher command positions or 
stand in the way of normal promotion tracks of the local officer corps.”134 For example, 
David Adams and Paul De La Garza describe the resentment of the high ranking military 
officials of Colombia in regard to Military Professional Resources Incorporation (MPRI): 
“Finally, Colombian officers felt patronized by retired American generals who hadn't 
seen combat in years.”135 
c. Support Functions 
At the first glance, support functions appear to be least important among 
all functions. However, they are as important as the operational functions. Moreover, the 
majority of PMCs’ functions outsourced by strong states are support functions. Let us 
recall one of the purposes of strong states in hiring PMCs: to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of armed forces, which are already capable of doing their operational 
functions, by assigning supporting functions to PMCs. If so, how can the support 
functions of PMCs affect the armed forces of strong states? The answer is by making 
them completely dependent on PMCs. More dependence on another agency means 
putting the operational functions under more risk, especially in emergency cases. This 
point is also related to the reliability of PMCs, which I will discuss in sub-section “5.” 
Moreover, being independent from the types of functions necessary, 
PMCs affect personnel management function of the armed forces negatively in both types 
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of states. Since PMI provides higher incomes for experienced military personnel, they 
tend to leave public services. David Barstow, a reporter for the New York Times, 
mentioned about $500 to $1500 a day for skilled military personnel.136 Avant 
emphasized the gap in pay scales by stating that “…senior enlisted members of the Army 
Green Berets or Navy SEALs made about $50,000 in base pay and that PMCs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were paying these retirees salaries ranging from $100,000-
200,000/year….”137 These high incomes in the private sector cause early retirements and 
resignations among military officers. Peter Singer presented an interesting argument that 
indicates the importance of the issue: “Special Forces commanders  in Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all expressed deep concern, 
with the policy responses ranging from the creation of special working groups of NCOs 
[Non-Commissioned Officers]  to explore the retention issue to allowing troopers to take 
a year’s leave of absence, in the hope that they would make their quick money and return, 
rather than be lost to the market forever.”138 Even though the ex-soldiers of weak states’ 
militaries can earn less money than nationals of strong states for the same dangerous 
work, they are earning more than the soldiers of their countries. Thus, the high incomes 
in PMI have an important effect on armed forces of both types of states, by depriving 
them of experienced personnel. 
4. Subordination of Private Military Companies 
In theory, PMCs are supposed to be subordinate to their principals. However, in 
practice, there are two dimensions of their subordination — to their principals and their 
home countries. The question is whether PMCs can pursue principals’ interests in their 
performances when the home and principal states are different. In other words, to whom 
are PMCs subordinate when the interests of principals and home states are in conflict? 
This creates a big problem for weak states. Since PMCs’ main interest is private gain, 
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they have to consider their reputation in the eyes of home states in order to get contracts 
or approval for contracts with other countries. They have to take into consideration the 
national interests of home countries. Harry Ed Soyster, spokesman of MPRI in 1995, 
said, “They are using us to carry out American foreign policy. We certainly don't 
determine foreign policy, but we can be part of the U.S. government executing its foreign 
policy.”139 These sentences indicate the importance of home states’ interests in PMCs. 
Another striking challenge for weak states is the subjective control of PMCs in 
weak states. I use the term “subjective control” in the sense that PMCs work for the 
interests of only one faction in a weak state. Especially in the case of civil conflicts, 
PMCs provide security, not for all of the population but for the party who pays for PMCs. 
As stated by Holmqvist, PMCs may make weak states weaker “by leading to a skewed 
distribution of security among populations.”140 The imbalance in the distribution of 
security causes more problems in conflicts and does not solve the main conflicts.  
5. Unreliability of Private Military Companies 
Since the only incentives for private contractors are private gains, it is often 
uncertain as to how they will perform in dangerous situations. During the contracting 
process, it is very difficult to see the exact security level. As stated by Avant, “There is 
nothing compelling contractors to remain on the battlefield once bullets begin to fly.”141 
Also Singer stated that “A company has the choice of what contracts to take and when to 
depart or suspend operations because it believes that the situation is too dangerous 
relative to the rewards.” He adds that “Whereas a soldier has no legal discretion once 
they enlist or are drafted, an individual employee decides who he or she wants to work 
for, where, and for what price, and then, once in theatre, still has the choice on when to 
stay or leave (whether they get a better job offer from a competing firm, think the mission 
and/or their superiors are not worth it, or simply because they are tired of the job, want to 
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see more of their family, etc.).”142 For example, because of a slew of contractor 
kidnappings in July 2004, and huge rates of violence in this period, U.S. forces 
experienced a wave of firms delaying, suspending, or ending operations.143 Another 
example of the unreliability of PMCs was when the employees of the British PMC 
Ghurka Security Guards disbanded after the killing of their ground commander in Sierra 
Leone in 1995.144  
Avant points out another issue on reliability. She says that because the 
companies’ only incentive is private gain, they may tend to minimize costs by deploying 
fewer personnel with fewer skills, both of which can cause miserable results.145 
Moreover, the selection mechanisms of companies are also controversial. For example, 
Steve Fainaru emphasized the absence of clear standards for private military contractors. 
He stated that a contractor, while he carries various types of weapons in Iraq, was 
prohibited from carrying a firearm in the U.S. because of his past unlawful behaviors.146   
In sum, we ask the same questions as Xavier Renou: What if PMCs or their 
employees refuse to fight in the battlefield? “What if the PMCs defect for fear of losing 
profits?” Moreover, “Is it safe to share secrets they could use against their clients? What 
if they decide to prolong wars, or deter peace efforts to demand more funds? And how 
can they help restore peace if both sides of a conflict can hire them?”147 
6. Are PMCs Really Cheap? 
In the literature, cost efficiency is among the advantages of using PMCs. 
However, there are some missed points in the calculation of costs. 
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First, the calculations are generally made for the short term. Paying the PMCs for a 
specific time seems cheaper than the cost to feed (including peacetime) more military forces 
to implement the same mission. However, the duration of missions is not always predictable. 
The second point is that, as mentioned above, most of the employees of PMCs are ex-
military personnel and their training costs, paid by societies, are not added into the 
calculations. In other words, states pay for individuals whom the states themselves have 
trained in the past. Renou states that sometimes the state must raise the salaries of military 
personnel to prevent them from joining PMCs.148 As he notes, “in comparative approach to 
costs, the costs of pensions paid to people who are young enough to keep on working 
elsewhere should be considered.”149  
Another important issue concerning the costs of PMCs is the cost of oversight 
mechanisms or the cost of lack of oversight. In order to ensure the efficiency of PMCs, 
oversight mechanisms are the most important tools. However, they bring extra costs to the 
principals. Moreover, as mentioned by Renou, the absence of effective oversight mechanisms 
causes different types of cost; waste of resources, sacrifice of quality or overbilling.150 For 
example, Halliburton overcharged the U.S. government with overpriced gasoline and for 
services not rendered (such as billing for meals not cooked). According to some Army 
auditors, it overcharged by an average of about 40 percent.151  
Even when we do not consider these indirect costs, PMCs may be more expensive 
than militaries depending on circumstances and conditions. For example, a Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report states that “in the case of personnel provided by one company 
(i.e., Blackwater Worldwide), the total cost of private security personnel was ‘significantly 
higher than the direct costs that would-be incurred by the [U.S.] military’ because of markups 
and other costs charged the U.S. government.”152  
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IV. CASE STUDY— PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN IRAQ 
A. BACKGROUND 
The most recent example of the extensive use of PMCs is the 2003 Iraq War and 
reconstruction efforts between the end of the war and today.  PMCs in Iraq are mainly 
from the United States. However, there are companies from England, South Africa, Iraq 
and some other states, as well. Their employees are from all over the world: Americans, 
British, South Africans, Iraqis, Fijians, Nepalese and others. According to a 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, the percentages of nationalities are as follow: 
20 percent of contractors from the U.S., nearly 40 percent are Iraqis, and the remaining 
40 percent are third country nationals.153 They have been performing a broad range of 
services from logistical support functions and advising and training Iraqi armed forces to 
armed security services in Iraq. At first glance, to the services that PMCs provide in Iraq, 
no operational military functions are among them. But the level of security can change 
the nature of protective services such as static security and convoy security to operational 
military functions. Singer argued that services such as site security, personal security and 
convoy security should be considered tactical military roles because of the high risk of 
armed conflict.154 Avant and Sigelman state that the name of a task may not reflect its 
actual function.155 They explain this by emphasizing that “jobs not technically considered 
core military tasks take on great danger or ability to inflict harm when performed in the 
midst of an insurgency.”156 
The number of PMCs and their employees is not known exactly due to ignorance 
and insufficient tracking and reporting mechanisms. According to a SIGIR report, which 
was updated on May 8, 2009, there are 93 PMCs in Iraq.157 The report also states another 
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233 companies, which cannot be identified as to whether they are related to physical 
security or some other kind of security (i.e., network security).158 But, other resources 
give different numbers. For example, a CRS report estimates the number of PSCs at 
about fifty companies with more than 30,000 employees, not including Iraqi nationals.159 
Moreover, “In March 2006, the director of the Private Security Company Association of 
Iraq estimated that there were 48,000 employees from 181 security firms operating 
there.”160 Finally, David Isenberg, in his most recent book, claims that “The total number 
of non-Iraqi PMC personnel is certainly less than 20,000, and despite claims to the 
contrary, PMCs do not constitute the second- or third- largest Army in Iraq….”161  It is 
important to note that these numbers are just for the security service, which is only one 
function of PMCs. According to a CBO report, there were nearly 190,000 private 
contractors of all stripes from truck drivers and cooks to armed security guards.162 By 
September 2009, the number of contractors has decreased due to the decrease in the 
number of U.S. troops. According to Moshe Schwartz, by September 2009, there were 
113,731 DoD contractors in Iraq.163 Of course there were also private contractors who 
were working for other U.S. agencies and for private firms, but the exact number is not 
clear. Even though the exact number is not known, it is certain that the presence of PMCs 
is at an unprecedented level in Iraq. Steve Fainaru’s statement about the extensive use of 
PMCs in Iraq indicates the importance of the issue: “after a while, the sight of an AK-
wielding male was no more surprising than seeing a palm tree or a street vendor or a 
cat.”164  
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The cost of outsourcing military functions is another important issue that cannot 
be ignored. According to the SIGIR report the cost of private security services was $5.9 
billion by May 8, 2009.165 But, a CBO paper estimates the total costs for private security 
services between $6 billion and $10 billion over the 2003-2007 period.166 The CBO 
paper also states that $3–6 billion of total costs belong to subcontracts.167 Again these 
estimates of costs are primarily related to security services, but not all military-related 
services that PMCs have been performing in Iraq. The CBO report estimates $85 billion 
for all contracts in the Iraq Theater, which constitutes 20 percent of U.S. spending in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2007.168  
Among the huge numbers of PMCs, several companies are more prominent as 
they are the holders of the biggest contracts. One of the biggest contracts in Iraq is the 
LOGCAP IV contract, which was awarded to three PMCs. These PMCs are DynCorp 
International, Fluor Intercontinental and Kellogg, Brown AND Root (KBR), which held 
the LOGCAP III contract by itself. The LOGCAP IV contract was awarded in 2006 as an 
Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quality (ID/IQ) contract.169 This means that three 
companies would compete for task orders under the LOGCAP IV contract. The contract 
was a logistical support contract under the Department of Defense. It includes supply 
operations (such as food, water, fuel, etc.), field operations (such as laundry, sanitary, 
waste management, morale activities, etc.) and other operations, like engineering, 
construction and also support to communication networks. The costs of the contract 
would be a maximum of $5 billion dollars per year for each company and the lifetime 
maximum cost of the contract would be $150 billion.170 
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Another big contract is Worldwide Personal Protective Services under the State 
Department. It was awarded to three companies, Blackwater, Triple Canopy and 
DynCorp again as an ID/IQ contract. It is a $3.2 billion security program171 that includes 
various types of security tasks from providing security for government officials and static 
location security, to providing security for mobile operations. 
Besides holding big contracts, some companies such as California Analysis 
Center, Incorporated (CACI), Blackwater and Ageis Defence Services gained notoriety 
for their unlawful activities. For example, in 2005, a web site displayed a video showing 
Aegis mercenaries shooting civilian vehicles accompanied by laughter and the voices of 
men joking with one another. As for Blackwater, its employees were involved in several 
incidents, among them the killing of 17 innocent Iraqis in 2007. Finally, the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, in which some of the CACI’s employees were involved, is another incident that 
displayed the unlawful behaviors of contractors in Iraq.  
The huge numbers and costs of private military contractors as well as their 
unlawful actions with no legal prosecution indicate that the history of the war in Iraq 
cannot be written without examining the role of PMCs. 
B. THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES ON THE U.S. 
AND IRAQ 
The extensive use of PMCs in Iraq made the problems of using PMCs more 
visible than before. As stated in the previous chapter, the scope of the challenges is very 
broad, ranging from fundamental ones (such as the threat to a state’s sovereignty) to 
wasting national resources by outsourcing. It is obvious that the challenges for the United 
States and Iraq are not the same. There are three main reasons for this argument. The first 
one is that while the United States has strong armed forces and strong governmental 
institutions, Iraq, as a new democracy, is still trying to establish its own institutions and 
effective armed forces. Second, while Iraq’s territory and citizens are directly subject to 
PMCs operations, the U.S.’ homeland and citizens are thousands of miles away from the 
theatre. Finally, the United States’ roles in relation to the PMCs in Iraq are the principal 
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and home state roles, while Iraq often has the territorial state role without having the 
other two roles. I will discuss the effects of using PMCs on the U.S. and Iraq in two 
separate sub-sections in order to make clear my argument. 
1. The Effects on the United States 
As, the United States, has the principal role, it interacts with PMCs from the 
decision process for outsourcing to the end of the implementation of tasks that have been 
outsourced to PMCs. I will examine every phase of the interaction between the U.S. and 
the PMCs by starting with the decision making phase. 
a. The Decision to Outsource Military Functions 
There are several incentives for the United States, as a strong state, to 
outsource military functions: the perception that PMCs are cheaper than standing armed 
forces; PMCs are more flexible and can be deployed more rapidly than militaries; PMCs 
relieve the task burden of armed forces that make them able to focus on operational 
functions; and outsourcing military functions is a way of escaping internal and external 
political pressures. It is important to note that there are two differences that separate the 
last incentive from the first three. First, it is an incentive of the government rather than 
the state itself. Second, it has not been spelled out officially as a reason to outsource. 
However, it is a strong incentive (may be the strongest one) to outsource military 
functions.  
Beyond the incentives of using PMCs, the question is what is the legal 
basis of contracting out the military functions? The term “inherently governmental 
functions” has the potential answer to this question. However, as stated in a White House 
Memorandum, “the line between inherently governmental activities that should not be 
outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject to private sector competition 
has been blurred and inadequately defined.”172 There are two main definitions of 
                                                 
172 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Government Contracting: Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,” March 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.tdgovernmentsolutions.biz/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-
Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject_-Go.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009). 
 58
“inherently governmental functions” within the federal law and policy of the United 
States. The first one is in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. 
According to the act, “‘inherently governmental function’ means a function that is so 
intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government 
employees.”173 The second definition exists in the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-76. According to the circular, “an inherently governmental activity is 
an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance 
by government personnel.”174 Among the examples of types of inherently governmental 
functions, both the FAIR Act and OMB Circular A-76 state that: 
(2)  Determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political, 
territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic 
action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract 
management, or otherwise; 
(3)  Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private 
persons…175 
The question here is whether or not the armed functions of PMCs in Iraq 
fit the definition of inherently governmental functions? In fact, even though they are 
affecting the life and property of private persons, the response of the Defense Department 
is quite different. The DoD classifies its functions in three categories, a) functions 
directly linked to warfighting, b) functions indirectly linked to warfighting, and c) 
functions not linked to warfighting.176 DoD’s defense review report emphasizes that 
functions directly linked to warfighting must be implemented by federal government  
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employees.177 As a result, armed security services that are performed by PMCs are 
perceived as non-inherently governmental functions by the DoD due to the fact that they 
are not directly linked to warfighting. 
The absence of a uniform and conclusive definition of “inherently 
governmental function” causes different interpretations by government agencies. This 
leaves the legitimacy of contracting out military functions controversial. In other words, 
the legal vacuum in the use of PMCs starts at the first instance. According to Luckey, 
Grasso and Manuel, “The 110th Congress required the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to review existing definitions of inherently governmental functions and 
‘develop a single consistent definition’ of inherently governmental functions by October 
14, 2009.”178 Unfortunately, OMB has yet to declare a definition. 
b. Selection and Contracting Process 
The selection and contracting process is the second phase in which the 
interaction between the government and PMCs actually starts. In other words, it is the 
first step of the principal-agent relationship. As noted by Schreier and Caparini, the U.S.-
based PMCs are required to register and get a license from the State Department under 
the International Transfer of Arms Regulations (ITAR).179  This requirement is needed 
for both internal and external missions. The main purpose of this system is to regulate 
U.S. PMCs that operate abroad and to ensure that PMCs will not operate against the 
national interests of the U.S. However, the Iraq case has showed that the system has 
weaknesses for a comprehensive regulation. 
There are three main problems in the selection and contracting process of 
the United States. First, the criteria for selecting PMCs are not clear. Background checks 
for companies and their employees are insufficient or completely ignored.  Moreover, the 
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PMCs that have been operating for the U.S. are not only U.S. companies. United States 
has also hired PMCs based in other states. These foreign PMCs are outside the registering 
and licensing system of the U.S. The point is that there is no checking mechanism in 
place for foreign PMCs within the contracting process. For example, despite the notoriety 
of a British company (Aegis Defence), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers renewed its 
contract for $475 million.180 Moreover, as stated by Steve Fainaru, the job requirements 
for individual contractors are not clear. According to his study in Iraq, a PMC employee 
who has been prohibited from carrying firearms in the U.S. can easily operate in Iraq by 
carrying grenades and even shoulder-fired missiles, let alone firearms.181 Another 
contractor (Emergency Medical Technician), whom Fainaru interviewed, stated that “Oh, 
I’m not really certified…But they made me a medic because I’ve read a lot of books. I 
have just haven’t gotten around to taking tests.”182 According to a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, even though the State Department and the Defense 
Department had both developed background screening procedures for the employees of 
PMCs who are U.S citizens operating in Iraq by July 2009, the Defense Department has 
still not developed screening procedures for PMC employees who are Iraqis and third 
country nationalities.183  
The second problem is related to the bidding processes of contracts. To get 
the best services at the best value, competition among the providers is very important. 
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 states that federal agencies shall obtain full 
and open competition by using competitive procedures.184 The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) states that “contracting officers shall provide for full and open 
competition through use of the competitive procedure(s) contained in this subpart that are 
best suited to the circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to 
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fulfill the government’s requirements efficiently.”185 FAR presents some exceptions for 
using full and open competition in the bidding process. It gives several reasons for the 
exclusion of provider(s), such as reducing costs, continuous availability of a reliable 
source and national emergency.186 Moreover, as stated by Grasso “The FAR and the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) give DoD at least seven 
exceptions to use other than full and open competition in the awarding of contracts.”187 
Two of them are important in Iraq for being justifications for uncompetitive contracts: (1) 
“unusual and compelling urgency,” which means the United States would be seriously 
injured if agencies are not allowed to limit the number of providers, and (2) the use of 
open and full competition would put national security in danger.188  
These justifications were used extensively in Iraq. For example, according 
to Isenberg’s study, between 2003 and 2007, the total cost of contracts with Blackwater 
was $1.059 billion. But only $48 million of that amount was won in competition with 
other PMCs.189Another example is the LOGCAP III contract, which was awarded to 
KBR in April 2006. It was worth $16.4 billion.190 According to Waxman, the LOGCAP 
III contract lacked price competition. Waxman stated that “LOGCAP III is an Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, which means that the total amount of work 
and specific projects to be completed were unknown at the time of the bid and award. 
When an IDIQ contract is put out to bid, there is no real opportunity for price competition 
because the projects under the contract have yet to be defined.”191 Waxman also criticizes 
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the LOGCAP IV contract due to limitations on price competition for specific task orders 
even though it was awarded three contractors. According to the report, contracts should 
be awarded to as many as ten contractors to provide an effective price competition for 
task orders.192 Moreover, the Waxman states that for the LOGCAP IV contract “the 
Army staff explained that in the initial competition for the execution contract, contractors 
will not be asked to compete on the basis of price. The contractors will be asked to 
submit a cost proposal for a hypothetical task under the contract, but they will not be 
bound by the hypothetical submission and will not be required to compete against each 
other on the basis of the fees they will charge.193” These examples of uncompetitive 
contracts indicate that “full and open competition” has become an exception in Iraq. 
The last problem of the selection and contracting phase is related to 
contract types. Contracts are generally classified in two broad categories: fixed-price 
contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts.194 Fixed-price contracts are usually used 
“when the risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of 
certainty.” 195 In Federal Acquisition Regulations, it is stated that “A firm-fixed-price 
contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the 
contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon 
the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or 
loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform 
effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting 
parties.”196 
In contrast, cost-reimbursement type contracts are suitable “when 
uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with 
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sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.”197 Because of high level of 
uncertainties in the environment that PMCs function, their contracts are often cost-
reimbursement contracts. For example, according to a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report, in Iraq, the U.S. government has primarily used cost-reimbursement type 
contracts in which the government has agreed to reimburse the companies for “all 
reasonable and allowable costs incurred in performing the work.”198 Cost-reimbursement 
contracts include: cost contracts, cost-sharing contracts, cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts, 
cost-plus-award fee contracts and cost-plus fixed fee contracts.199 According to Grasso, 
in 2005, the U.S. government spent $110 billion dollars for cost-plus contracts of which 
nearly half ($52 billion) were cost-plus-award-fee contracts.200 In these contracts, the 
private contractors’ fees increase with contract costs. As stated by Grasso, “Increased 
costs means increased fees to contractors. There is no incentive for the contractor to limit 
the government’s costs.”201 With regard to this point, Schreier and Caparini argue that 
“the contractor’s profit is a percentage of their costs, thus giving them an incentive to 
keep those costs high – which is hardly a recipe for efficiency or rigor.”202  
PMCs usually use the overhead costs to make the total costs much higher, 
and thus get higher fees. For example, in Iraq, the overhead costs of some PMCs’ 
contracts ranged from 11 to 55 percent of total costs.203 According to Grasso, the 
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costs totaled about $52.7 million. Moreover, for another five contracts with KBR, the 
government was billed $62 million for administrative costs, while the direct construction 
expenses were about $26.7 million.204  
Subcontracting is another way of increasing costs. For example, in one 
case, Blackwater guarded the food trucks of a Kuwaiti company. It added overhead costs 
and a 36 percent markup to its bill and then sent the bill the Kuwaiti company. The 
Kuwaiti company then added its overhead costs and profits to the bill and sent it to a food 
company. The food company did the same thing and forwarded the bill to KBR. Then 
KBR sent the total costs fees to the U.S. government.205 Thus, KBR could get higher fees 
as a result of subcontracting. 
In sum, there are three main problems in this phase: insufficient selection 
standards, uncompetitive contracting and cost-reimbursement contracts. These problems 
cause poor quality military services and waste taxpayers’ dollars.  
c. Operation in Theatre 
The most problematic phase is the implementation of the tasks. The main 
problem is the legal vacuum in which PMCs have been operating in Iraq. PMCs and their 
employees, who are operating in Iraq, are not accountable to any legal institutions.  
Because of the absence of effective international law (discussed in the 
third chapter) to regulate PMCs, national laws must be examined. The first option is the 
local law under which PMCs operate. In Iraq, this had not been a realistic possibility until 
the effective date of the Withdrawal Agreement, which was January 01, 2009.206 With 
regard to the Iraqi Laws regulating the PMCs, there was only Coalitional Provisional 
Authority (CPA) Order Number 17 that had not been rescinded or superseded by the Iraqi 
government.  According to CPA Order No. 17, “…Contractors shall not be subject to 
Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their 
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Contracts….”207 Also, it states that “Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal 
process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a 
Contract or any sub-contract thereto.”208 As stated by Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura, 
Iraqi authorities could start legal action against contractors due to their unlawful 
actions.209 However, Order 17 states that “Certification by the Sending State that its 
Contractor acted pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Contract shall, in any Iraqi 
legal process, be conclusive evidence of the facts so certified.”210 In other words, Iraqi 
authorities could not take any legal action against contractors without the consent of the 
sending states. However, in no case did any sending states declare their consent for legal 
action against their contractors by Iraqi authorities. The alleged reason behind this 
immunity from Iraqi laws was the insufficiency of the Iraqi jurisdiction (such as due 
process). But if this is the case, there should be other alternatives to make a legal case 
possible against contractors. In theory, the alternatives are the national laws of the 
sending states. For this reason, we have to examine the national laws of the United States. 
(1) Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ): As 
mentioned by Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura, “jurisdiction of certain federal statutes 
extends to U.S. nationals at U.S. facilities overseas that qualify as part of the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ) of the United States.”211 These criminal 
statutes, which apply in the SMTJ include maiming, assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse, 
assault or contact, murder and manslaughter.212 For example, “a CIA contractor was 
convicted under this provision in 2007 for the assault of a detainee in Afghanistan.”213 
Moreover, according to a CBO paper, “the U.S. has asserted jurisdiction over crimes 
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committed against U.S. property or personnel, regardless of where the crimes occur.”214 
Nevertheless, the crimes committed by contractors against Iraqis and their property are 
out of this provision. Also, it does not cover third country nationalities, which consist of 
40 percent of all the contractors in Iraq. Furthermore, according to a GAO report, people 
who are already subject to MEJA are not subject to SMTJ.215 
(2) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Citing Elsea, Schwartz and 
Nakamura, “many federal statues prescribe criminal sanctions for offenses committed by 
or against U.S. nationals overseas, including War Crimes Act of 1996.”216 But they also 
state that crimes involving only foreign nationals may fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. courts.217 Moreover, in other cases in which a foreign national is the perpetrator and 
the victim is a U.S. national, the jurisdiction of U.S courts applies to foreign nationals 
only if they are found in the United States.218 
(3) Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA):  Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) is an option for prosecuting private contractors 
who commit crimes abroad. In section 2, chapter 212 says that: 
(a)  Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that would 
constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 
year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States— 
(1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the 
United States...219  
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According to the GAO report (July 2008), until 2004, MEJA was 
only applicable to DoD contractors and subcontractors. In other words, the contractors 
and subcontractors of agencies other than DoD, such as the State Department and the 
United States Agency and International Development (USAID), were outside the scope 
of MEJA. With an amendment from the beginning of 2004, it also covers “any other U.S. 
agency to the extent that the contractor employee’s employment relates to supporting the 
mission of the DoD overseas.”220 But it still does not cover the contractors (whose 
employment does not relate to DoD’s missions) that are outside of the definition. 
Moreover, it does not cover contractors who are nationals of a territorial state or residing 
there ordinarily.221 
(4) Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ): Uniform Code 
of Military Justice is another option for regulating private contractors. In article 2, it says 
that:  
(a)  the following persons are subject to this chapter: 
… (10) In time of war, persons serving with or 
accompanying an armed force in the field…222 
Until the amendment by “the John Warner National STAT.254 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,” UCMJ was not applicable to any 
contractors because there had been no declaration of war by Congress. But it has 
amended UCMJ’s article 2(a) to read “in time of declared war or a contingency 
operation.”223 It extends military jurisdiction in contingency operations (such as Iraq ) to 
“persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.” However, according 
a GAO report (July 2008), there are some challenges of application of UCMJ to DoD 
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civilians such as “variations between the rules of courts-martial and civilian trials on key 
issues such as jury composition and due process.”224  
Even though there are options to try private contractors for their 
unlawful actions abroad, they are not sufficient and there are “big holes.” For example, as 
stated by Isenberg, because of legal doctrine (government contractor), a contractor may 
not be sued in American courts if his treatment was deemed part of the U.S. 
government’s operations.225 Moreover, there are a number of examples showing that 
private contractors were not prosecuted for their unlawful actions. For example, Andrew 
J. Moonen who was a contractor for Blackwater, allegedly killed an Iraqi guard of Iraqi 
Vice President, Adel Abdul Mahdi. After the case, the U.S. Embassy and Blackwater 
shipped him out of Iraq immediately. No legal action was started against him. Moreover, 
two months later he was employed by another PMC in Kuwait, which was operating 
under a DoD contract.226 Singer points to another example that shows the immunity of 
contractors. He states, “The U.S. Army found that contractors were involved in 36% of 
the proven abuse incidents and identified 6 PMF employees in particular that were 
culpable in the abuses. However, not one of these individuals has yet been indicted, 
prosecuted, or punished. This is despite the fact that the U.S. Army has found the time to 
do so for the enlisted soldiers involved.”227  
The immunity of private military contractors put the reputation of 
the U.S. as an advocate of human rights in danger. The United States is seen as 
responsible as the contractors for unlawful incidents in Iraq by the international 
community. Moreover, it harms the overarching objective of the United States, which is 
to establish a self-governing democratic Iraq, because the unlawful behaviors of 
contractors increase the hostility against Americans and their functions among the Iraqi 
public. The statement of an Iraqi security official in the Ministry of Interior confirms this 
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conclusion. He argued that “They are part of the reason for all the hatred that is directed 
at Americans, because people don’t know them as Blackwater, they know them only as 
Americans.”228 
Besides immunity from laws, another problem in this phase is the 
effectiveness of PMCs: are they really effective in implementing the tasks which are 
stated in their contracts? What are the standards of measuring the effectiveness? In fact, 
defining standards to measure the effectiveness of a military activity is difficult because 
of the uncertain nature of the environment. For example, the level of danger cannot be 
foreseen at the time of contracting. Even though it is difficult to define the standards, 
there are some indications of the ineffectiveness of some companies. As stated by Avant, 
“There is nothing compelling contractors to remain on the battlefield once bullets begin 
to fly.”229 For example, “there were periodic reports that supply was inadequate, both 
during the conflict and particularly as the insurgency accelerated in spring/summer 2003, 
because civilian contractors failed to show up.”230 Moreover, Avant adds, when a task is 
contracted out, PMCs have a tendency to use fewer personnel than the military. For 
example, a PMC assigned 26 personnel to guard a U.S. base that had been protected 
before by more than 150 military personnel.231 The question is whether the company 
gave the U.S. government what it wanted. The response is controversial and it cannot be 
clear until the base is attacked. Until such time, PMCs will continue to claim that they are 
effective. Also, PMCs are not in the military chain of command and commanders of U.S. 
forces cannot order them to do something out of their contracts. But, as stated above, the 
unpredictable nature of armed conflict may change the requirements. At this point, PMCs 
are ineffective to answer the changing situations.  
Thus, the ineffectiveness and unreliability of PMCs affects the 
functions of the military that are significantly dependent on them. For example, when a 
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PMC fails to supply the military or to protect a military base or a supply convoy, the most 
important consequences will be to the military itself.  
d. Oversight 
Oversight is a continuing function that should start at the selection and 
contracting phase. Oversight mechanisms are indispensible elements of a principal-
agency relationship to ensure that agencies are not shirking. There are two main purposes 
of an oversight function. The first one is to compensate the government’s losses due to 
agencies’ wrongdoings by punishing agencies for their actions. The second, and more 
important one, is the deterrent effect on agencies. Having capable oversight mechanisms 
signals agencies that oversight institutions have the capability to find the wrongdoing 
agencies and that shirking has important consequences for them. 
Oversight functions can be classified as three types: oversight on 
contracting, oversight during implementation and oversight on completed contracts. The 
United States has institutions that implement all types of oversight in order to establish 
control, effectiveness and efficiency. However, in practice there are problems. 
Congressional oversight is the most important institution that should 
function in all three types of oversight. However, in the realm of PMCs, congressional 
oversight is almost absent. Congressional oversight in the contracting process also 
includes oversight on the decisions of the executive branch for outsourcing. The 
executive branch uses leeway in laws. As Newell and Sheehy state, under the ITAR 
licensing system “Congress does not need to be informed of a contract in advance of the 
issuance of a related license unless the contract is valued at over $50 million.”232 
According to Caparini, to avoid the requirement for notification of Congress, the 
contracts over $50 million can be separated into multiple components.233 She also states 
that, even when Congressional notification is required, it is very difficult to block a 
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defense contract due to a 30- day time limit.234 Because of the absence of congressional 
oversight, Avant and Sigelman argue that PMCs impeded public consent235 and they add 
that “The US Congress has less information about and control over the use of contractors 
than the use of troops,” which means that the executive branch can rely on contractors to 
eliminate congressional  (and by extension, public) opposition.236 The lack of 
congressional oversight also means that the contracts with PMCs are not transparent, an 
important requirement of democracy besides public consent. The dialogue, in a hearing 
on the Fallujah Incidents, indicates the degree of non-transparency in PMCs contracts. 
At the February 7 hearing, Andrew Howell asserted that incident reports 
about the Fallujah incident were classified by the government and thus not available for 
release to the Committee [Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]:  
MR. HOWELL: Sir, some of the facts of that day were classified by the 
government and we are not permitted to discuss those.  
REP. WELCH: Well, let me ask you this. This committee has requested 
copies of that report or reports, correct?  
MR. HOWELL: Yes, sir.  
REP. WELCH: Will you turn over to this committee those reports?  
MR. HOWELL: Sir, we cannot turn over classified information. It would 
be a criminal act.237 
Oversight during the implementation of tasks also has some weaknesses. 
In Iraq, this type of oversight function is implemented by government agencies and in 
some cases by other contractors as well. There are two types of oversight functions by the 
government on contract implementation: a) day to day oversight by Contracting Officer 
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Representatives (CORs), and b) periodic inspections by Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) Quality Assurance Representatives. According to a SIGIR report, 
“Generally, the CORs’ experience and training was limited, and their time available to 
devote to their oversight responsibilities insufficient. As a result, their abilities to perform 
their oversight responsibilities were hampered.”238   The report states that even though 
DCMA Quality Assurance Representatives’ inspections can provide oversight, they are 
not substitutes for CORs’ day-to-day oversight activities.239 Moreover, as stated by a 
DCMA representative about CORs in Iraq “where military units have already moved out 
and left critical shortages in CORs overseeing remaining contractors in that area.”240 
Moreover, in Iraq, oversight functions over some reconstruction contracts 
were outsourced to other contractors. Even though this has not often been an issue for 
contracts of military functions, outsourcing the oversight functions of the LOGCAP IV 
contract to another private company was considered.241 As stated in a report of the 
Committee on Government Reform, the main problem of this concept is inorganic links 
between private companies.242 In other words, companies who are responsible for 
overseeing another company may have pre-existing relationships with them under other 
contracts.  
For example, CH2M Hill was hired to oversee the reconstruction activities 
of Washington Group International at the same time that CH2M Hill and 
Washington Group International were "integrated partners" on a large 
Department of Energy contract in the United States. Similarly, Parsons 
and another company were charged with overseeing the activities of Fluor 
even though Parsons and Fluor were partners in a $2.6 billion joint venture 
to develop oil fields in Kazakhstan.243 
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This lack of transparency and effective oversight makes it virtually 
impossible for the public to assess the practice of private military contracting and harms 
democratic values. Moreover, the absence or insufficiency of oversight functions waste 
taxpayers’ dollars and make effectiveness and efficiency difficult. 
However, there is a positive side with regard to oversight functions of the 
U.S. Institutions such as SIGIR, CRS and GAO provide huge amounts of information to 
Congress and the executive branch. Even though the information provided by these 
institutions is important, they do not perform continuing oversight functions on contracts 
that can keep PMCs from shirking. 
2. The Effects on Iraq 
The challenges of PMCs for Iraq are different from the challenges for the U.S. As 
discussed mainly in the third chapter, the reason for this is that Iraq is an infant 
democracy and does not have strong government institutions and armed forces. In other 
words, it is a weak state. Unlike the U.S., the theatre in which PMCs are operating is 
Iraq’s own soil.  
The Iraqi Government has not been in a position to decide whether PMCs should 
be used or not. PMCs have been used by Coalition Forces, especially the U.S. without the 
consent of the Iraqi government. Thus, the incentives for Iraq’s use of PMCs cannot 
provide insight to the issue. However, after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, the Iraqi 
government will be in a position to decide whether PMCs should be used or not. But the 
possible incentives for Iraq are not the same as U.S. incentives, which are stated above. 
Neither political pressures, monetary reasons, nor the flexibility of PMCs will have much 
effect on the Iraqis’ decision. They will have more important factors to consider, which 
are directly linked with the survival of a democratic Iraq, including sovereignty, the 
capability of state institutions and the armed forces, ethnic violence and the overall 
security situation. 
The management of the use of force is an important element of sovereignty. As 
stated in the second chapter, it also has another function that a state needs: the protection 
of its own citizens. When we look at the period between 2003 and today, the Iraqi 
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government has not had control over the management of the use of force and it has not 
been capable of protecting its citizens. With respect to PMCs, the picture of Iraq in this 
period is one of thousands of armed foreign nationalities walking around, some of them 
killing Iraqis without reason. The Iraqi government cannot do anything to protect its 
citizens or punish the perpetrators of crimes. For example, the case of five Blackwater 
contractors who killed 17 Iraqi civilians in an “indiscriminate” shooting in Baghdad 
“quickly came to be viewed as a test of the sovereignty of the newly founded Maliki 
government and of its ability to stand up to the Bush administration.”244 The result was 
the long delay for trial of five contractors until the beginning of 2010.245 Finally, the 
federal judge dismissed all charges against the five contractors on December 31, 2009.246 
Moreover, there are many examples of incidents after which there was not even an 
investigation. Not surprisingly, the Maliki Government could not pass the test. Thus, the 
effectiveness of the government of Iraq (GoI) for providing security, in the eyes of the 
Iraqi public, is not high. According to a report that was submitted to the Congress, “When 
asked in August 2009 if they believed the GoI was effective at maintaining security, 49% 
of Iraqis said the GoI was effective….”247 Unless the Iraqi Government passes  new 
legislation which cover PMCs and their employees, including foreign nationals, the lack 
of sovereignty will continue.  
Moreover, after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, sovereignty will continue to be 
a concern for the Iraqi government. This withdrawal does not mean that a stable security 
environment has been established in Iraq. As will be discussed below, the number of 
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PMCs in Iraq will likely increase. My argument is that the types of PMCs functions, the 
nationality of PMCs and their employees, and also the capability of institutions and 
armed forces will determine the degree of sovereignty in Iraq.  
According to a GAO report, while an 8 percent decrease was seen in the number 
of contractors since May 2009, the number of armed private security contractors 
increased 23 percent in the third quarter of fiscal year 2009.248 According to Schwartz, 
between June 2008 and December 2009, while the total number of all contractors has 
decreased by 27 percent, the number of private security contractors increased by 38 
percent.249 This means that the type of PMCs has changed from the end of the spear to 
the tip of the spear. It cannot be denied that operational services are imposing more of a 
threat on Iraq’s sovereignty than any other type of PMCs functions. The need for armed 
services stems from the insufficiency of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to provide 
security independently. Although the capability of ISF has developed to some degree, it 
is of insufficient quality and quantity. This should not be seen as a justification for hiring 
operational services, however, because outsourcing security services, in turn, becomes an 
obstacle in the way to the development of Iraqi Security Forces.   
Moreover, most of the experienced PMCs and their individual contractors are 
from Western countries, mainly the U.S. This means that even though U.S. troops will 
withdraw from Iraq completely, the continuing presence of PMCs in Iraq will be 
perceived by Iraqis as a continuing presence of the U.S. in Iraq. This perception will 
harm the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and the ISF in the eyes of the Iraqi public. 
Moreover, the current legal framework cannot cover the foreign contractors. This 
argument does not mean, however, that local PMCs and Iraqi individuals should be hired 
for armed security services. They would also have negative consequences for Iraq. As 
mentioned by Max Singer in a conference, “Iraq is not a real nation. It was artificially 
created by the League of Nations less than a century ago when the Ottoman Empire was 
dismantled. So Iraqis don't have a sense of loyalty or attachment to the nation of Iraq; 
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they identify with their ethnic group – and their religion and tribe. Realistically there are 
three separate groups in the country of Iraq: Sunni Arabs (20%), Shiite Arabs (60%), and 
Kurds (20%). They care little for each other and the rivalry among them is the primary 
feature of the Iraqi political landscape.”250 As such, local PMCs create good 
opportunities for ethnic groups and tribes to be armed. Without effective institutions 
capable of controlling the PMI, allowing locally armed PMCs may be suicide for Iraq. 
Furthermore, since 2003, the legitimacy of PMCs’ presence in Iraq has been 
based on weak assumptions. As stated by Steve Fainaru, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
and Ministry of Trade, which gave the PMCs a license to operate, were assumed as 
effective institutions. Also, associations, such as the Private Security Company 
Association of Iraq (PSCAI), were assumed to have “ensuring integrity, commitment and 
success for each and every merc.”251 But the opposite was true. The government 
institutions of Iraq were not effective and could not operate independently. PSCAI, as 
stated by a British contractor, gave licenses to any paying company.252 For now, despite 
some development in functions of state institutions such as Ministry of Interior (MoI) and 
Ministry of Defense (MoD), government institutions are not capable of handling the 
problems that PMCs (especially operational functions) impose on Iraq. 
To this day, with respect to PMCs, Iraq has played a territorial role without 
having principal state or home state roles. This means that PMCs in Iraq are completely 
out of the control of the Iraqi government. In the future, especially when the withdrawal 
of the U.S. troops is completed, the Iraqi government may assume the other two roles, the 
principal and home state roles. But the threat to its sovereignty will continue. It cannot be 
denied that the Iraqi government will need PMCs, due to the insufficiency of the Iraqi 
Armed Forces. However, the type of military services, the nationality of PMCs and their  
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employees, as well as the sectarianism influence should be considered before deciding to 
outsource. Moreover, the capacity of government institutions and laws should be taken 
into consideration. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The extensive use of PMCs in Iraq has had important effects on the U.S. and Iraq. 
Although the total number of contractors has decreased recently, the number of contractors 
who perform operational services has increased. The challenges that the PMI imposes on the 
two states are not same. First of all, while the U.S. is a superpower that has strong armed 
forces and capable state institutions, Iraq is a new and weak democracy that does not have 
sufficient armed forces and institutions. The second difference is that PMCs have been 
operating on Iraq’s soil and interacting with Iraqi civilians directly, while the U.S. homeland 
and its citizens are thousands of miles away from the theatre. Third, with regard to relations 
with PMCs, the U.S. has the roles of home state and principal state, which make the PMCs 
dependent on the U.S. In contrast, until today, Iraq has had only the territorial state role 
without having the other roles.   
The main challenges for the U.S. in the use of PMCs abroad are: 
(1)  A declining international reputation due to the immunity of private military 
contractors in Iraq. 
(2)  Lack of clarity with respect to the definition of “Inherently Governmental 
Functions” and the non-transparent nature of private military contracts harm 
the legitimacy of outsourcing military functions and this, in turn, harms the 
values of democracy.  
(3)  Wasting taxpayers’ dollars due to non-competitive contracting and cost-
reimbursement contracts and also due to insufficient oversight on contracts. 
(4)  Negative effects on military functions due to the unreliability of PMCs.  
As for Iraq, the main challenges are related to the survival of a democratic Iraq: 
(1)  PMCs (especially operational functions) impose an important threat to the 
sovereignty of Iraq. 
(2)  The use of PMCs will be an obstacle in the development progress of ISF. 
(3)  Local PMCs may be a good opportunity for ethnic groups to be armed, this in 
turn, may create a security dilemma between the factions. 
For these reasons, the question is what are the solutions for two countries? This 
question will be answered in the next chapter. 
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V. OPTIONS FOR REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES 
In the literature, various options have been suggested for regulating PMCs. The 
British “Green Paper” published on February 12, 2002, is an important document that 
presents six options for regulating PMCs. These are: a ban on military activity abroad; a 
ban on recruitment for military activity abroad; a licensing regime for military services; 
registration and notification; a general license for PMCs/PSCs; self regulation — through 
a voluntary code of conduct.253  
According to Caroline Holmqvist, a licensing regime for military services “is 
likely to have both the greatest effectiveness and the widest purchase.”254 She also 
mentions the insufficiency of national regulations for three reasons; “a) the ability of 
PSCs to adapt in order to circumvent or evade legislation, b) the problem of 
extraterritorial enforcement, c) the lack of adequate mechanisms for oversight of 
companies abroad.”255 She also argues that “short of a global enforceable regime 
covering the activities of private security companies, regulation by and through regional 
organizations can offer wider scope and purchase than regulation at the national level 
alone.”256 
Michael Cottier approaches the regulation issue in a different way. He classifies 
states as exporting states, territorial states and contracting states.257 Then he presents 
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well, some criteria for contracting states to select PMCs. His main argument is that there 
are two general options for territorial and exporting states: a) a ban on certain military 
services, b) a licensing system.258  
According to Doug Brooks, PMCs are willing to accept strong national 
regulations and international humanitarian laws.259 He argues that regulation should not 
prevent flexibility and speed of the companies. He sees contracts as the best way to 
regulate PMCs by states.260 
Virginia Newell and Benedict Sheehy argue that when PMCs are adequately 
defined, an effective national regulation can be established. They believe that a licensing 
system that includes the best characteristics of the U.S. and South Africa’s current 
systems might be the best option.261 Secondly, they argue that a licensing system “could 
be usefully supplemented by an independent industry association that develops codes of 
conduct and standardized training in areas such as international humanitarian law.”262 
Finally, states in which the majority of PMCs are based (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France and South Africa) should not wait for international regulation to 
regulate them nationally. They argue that such states must coordinate their efforts as a 
starting point for international regulation.263  
The two extreme options—(1) a ban on PMCs’ activities and (2) self regulation of 
industry—are both unrealistic and impracticable. To ban private military activities is 
almost impossible, because today they are so integrated into the operations of states 
domestically and internationally. Moreover, the industry has been somewhat self-
regulated until today; however, the results are not promising. Thus, states should learn to 
live with PMCs but to regulate them as well. In this chapter, I will discuss the best 
options for states and the international community to regulate PMCs. Throughout the 
                                                 
258 Cottier, “Elements for Contracting and Regulating Private Military Companies,” 646–653. 
259 Brooks, “Protecting People: the PMC Potential,” 4. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Newell and  Sheehy, “Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interactions, and Reactions,” 100. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid., 100–101. 
 81
chapter, the United States, as a strong state and Iraq as a weak state, will be the primary 
cases of my argument. I will explain my argument in two main sections: national 
regulation and international regulation.  
A. NATIONAL REGULATION 
As advocated by Newell and Sheehy, a registration and licensing system can be 
an effective model for all states in the regulation of PMCs. In this system, PMCs will be 
under a continuing control regime. In the beginning, PMCs will be required to register 
with the government for specific functions (i.e., armed security services or logistical 
support) in order to legitimize their presence and operations. At this step, the background 
and the capability of the PMCs would be evaluated by the government to ensure that 
PMCs can implement the functions for which they have applied. Moreover, the 
background and skill checks of individual contractors of PMCs must be made 
continuously, starting with this step until the completion of the contracts. At the second 
step, PMCs would be required to have licenses for each contract with their home 
government or a foreign state. There would be several purposes for this step. First, is to 
control contracts as to whether they comply with national laws, international laws and 
also the territorial state laws where the PMCs will operate. Second, the contracts and the 
states or NGOs that are principals of the PMCs would be checked to ensure that the 
PMCs would not operate against the national interests of the home country. Third, 
contracts would be checked according to the registration terms of the PMCs. This would 
ensure that PMCs could not conduct functions for which they were not registered. 
However, establishment of a registration and licensing system at the national level 
can provide only minimum control over PMCs. The system must be supplemented by 
national criminal laws, oversight and enforcement mechanisms in order to provide 
control, effectiveness and efficiency. 
The system and supplementary factors that are stated above give a general 
guidance for states in the regulation of the PMCs. However, the priorities of states are 
different according to the challenges they face. Differences in priorities stem from three 
main areas. First, while the problems of strong states are mainly related to the use of 
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PMCs abroad, the main problems of weak states are related to the internal use of PMCs. 
Second, while strong states have the capacity and need political will to implement 
regulatory requirements, weak states have to implement restrictions on the use of PMCs. 
Third, most of the big and capable PMCs are based in strong states. 
1. The United States as a Strong State 
Even though the United States hires PMCs for protective services that sometimes 
resemble operational military functions because of the high level of danger, it does not 
outsource operational military functions directly. However, as mentioned in the fourth 
chapter, it is not clear in the definition of inherently governmental functions which 
military functions should be outsourced. Thus, the first step for the United States is to 
solve this. I have to assume that this lack of clarity will continue or the possible definition 
will exclude armed security services from the inherently governmental functions in order 
to generalize my argument for all strong states. In other words, I assume that armed 
security services would be outside of the potential definition of inherently governmental 
functions, thus PMCs will continue to perform these services.  
The internal use of PMCs does not pose a big problem for the United States 
because it has strong national laws that cover PMCs and their employees, including 
foreign nationals. Moreover, the U.S. has all three state roles when PMCs are operating in 
the homeland. The main problem is related with the use and export of PMCs abroad. 
Unfortunately, as stated in the previous chapter, national laws, oversight mechanisms 
(congressional and executive) are not sufficient for that. The ineffectiveness of 
institutions over the external use of PMCs creates some important challenges even though 
they are not as extreme as for weak states. The negative international reputation of the 
U.S., the ineffectiveness of PMCs, and the waste of national resources are important 
consequences of unregulated PMCs for the U.S.   
The first step in an effective registration system must be the classification of 
military and police functions. Dew and Hudgens’ classification may be a model for the 
United States. Then, the next step must be defining the requirements for companies and 
individual contractors to be registered for specific military functions. Registration would 
 83
mean that the capacity and capability of a PMC for a specific function (i.e., armed static 
security) is approved by the government. Also, individual skill and background checks 
must be made, in detail, and individual employees must be required to register with the 
government for specific functions. The purpose of this is to prevent the inappropriate use 
of employees in areas other than their experience and skills. 
Moreover, before a contracting process (contracts with the U.S. government or 
other states) PMCs must be required to have licenses for each contract. Here, the 
important point is that PMCs must be granted licenses for functions for which they have 
been registered. The purposes of a licensing system are to examine the contract for the 
national interests of the U.S., the final control of the capability of companies, and also to 
prevent the companies from operating in functions that they do not have capacity to 
implement. Furthermore, congressional oversight, which provides transparency and 
public consent, must be in effect over registration and licensing processes.  
As for the implementation of functions, national laws must be extended to cover 
the activities of PMCs and their employees abroad. UCMJ and MEJA, with amendments, 
are the most promising even though their implementation over contractors has been seen 
only rarely. Moreover, criminal investigation mechanisms that can operate abroad must 
be established to collect information and bring cases to the courts.  
Furthermore, open and fair competition must be provided among the PMCs to 
ensure that best quality is hired for best value. Also, the type of contracts must be price-
fixed type contracts, which eliminate PMCs’ incentives to keep costs higher. And, the 
contracts must be overseen on a daily basis to ensure that PMCs comply with the contract 
terms and national and international laws. Also, audits and other oversight activities by 
government and congressional agencies must be in effect throughout the contract period 
and afterwards.  
At first glance, it seems that there are a lot of things to do. However, the United 
States has the capacity to do them, and we can see attempts in some areas. For example, 
the amendments in UCMJ and MEJA and the determination of the Obama administration 
over using price-fixed contracts indicate development in regulating PMCs. 
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As argued by Jennings, political will is the most important requirement of states, 
including the United States, for regulating PMCs.264 Today, the United States seems to 
have political will in some areas even though the possibility of success is open to 
discussion. For example, in a memorandum on March 4, 2009, President Obama 
announced his administration’s priorities over contracting: “(1) increased competition; 
(2) use of fixed-price contracts; (3) ensuring that the acquisition workforce can manage 
and oversee contracts; and (4) ensuring that functions considered to be inherently 
governmental are not contracted out.”265 Moreover, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) report indicates a decrease in the number of contractors and a desire to 
give appropriate tasks to PMCs by stating that “Department [DoD] will reduce the 
number of support service contractors to their pre-2001 level of 26 percent of the 
workforce (from the current level of 39 percent) and replace them, if needed, with full-
time government employees. These efforts will help establish a balanced total workforce 
of military, government civilians, and contractor personnel that more appropriately aligns 
public and private-sector functions, and results in better value for the taxpayer.”266 
In sum, my argument is that the United States has to establish a registration and 
licensing system specifically for the use and export of PMCs abroad. National laws must 
be extended to cover contractors who operate abroad and must be supported by effective 
oversight, investigation and enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, effective contracting 
elements such as fixed-price contracts, and open and fair competition should be provided. 
The capacity of the United States is sufficient to make all of these real. As stated above, 
the starting point is the willingness to regulate PMCs.   
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2. Iraq as a Weak State 
Iraq, as a new democratic state, has to handle the case of PMCs differently from 
the United States. The most important difference is that unlike the U.S., Iraq has to 
regulate PMCs specifically for internal use of them. The regulation of PMCs by the Iraqi 
Government requires more than just political will. Beyond political will, the Iraqi 
government has to develop its institutions to control and regulate PMCs. However, it is 
difficult to have effective institutions in the short term for Iraq as it is a weak state. Thus, 
the Iraqi government must seek to minimize the negative effects of PMCs that operate in 
its own territory. 
First of all, due to an insufficient state capacity (weak institutions), Iraq must seek 
to limit the presence of PMCs, especially foreign PMCs, in Iraq. In particular, after the 
withdrawal of the United States, the first goal of the Iraqi government must be to limit the 
numbers of foreign PMCs operating in Iraq, because, as stated above, foreign PMCs 
impose an important threat to Iraq’s sovereignty. There are two options for Iraq to limit 
the presence of foreign PMCs in Iraq: a complete ban of the functions of foreign PMCs in 
Iraq; and a fee or taxation system in which the amount can be changed according to the 
type of functions. The first option is not possible, because as mentioned above, the need 
for PMCs will be higher after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, and because the numbers 
and capacities of local PMCs are insufficient by now. Thus, a fee or taxation system, as 
opposed to banning them, seems more feasible. Furthermore, a limit on individual non-
Iraqi employees is also required in Iraq. Again, a defined fee for each non-Iraqi 
contractor can be an option for this purpose. A taxation system on foreign PMCs and 
foreign employees will have two positive results. First, potential clients of PMCs will 
tend to hire local PMCs because they can be controlled easier than foreign PMCs. Second 
PMCs, in turn, will tend to hire Iraqi contractors and this tendency will provide 
employment for Iraqis.   
A type of taxation system can also be applied in order to limit the functions at the 
top of the spear. As stated in the previous chapter, the implementation of operational 
functions can be an obstacle for the development of the Iraqi Armed forces.  
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A background checking function for the registering and licensing system is more 
significant for Iraq than for the U.S. because local PMCs can be seen as an opportunity to 
be armed, by ethnic groups, and they can use PMCs for their group’s interests. In order to 
prevent this potential danger, the establishment of an agency under MoI or MoD, with 
high intelligence capabilities and a skilled staff, is required. 
Moreover, the Iraqi Government must legislate effective national laws that cover 
private military contractors, including foreign PMCs and their individuals. The 
registration and licensing system, fee or taxation system, and national laws for PMCs 
must be supplemented by oversight and enforcement mechanisms, which are 
indispensible elements of a principal-agent relationship. 
In this explanation, it seems that while the United States’ priorities are related to 
all three of the dimensions of civil-military relations, control, effectiveness and 
efficiency, Iraq’s priorities are related to only control for now. Of course, Iraq has to deal 
with effectiveness and efficiency in the use of PMCs, but these should be long-term goals 
after the establishment of effective control over PMCs. The United States, on the other 
hand, has the capacity to implement all three dimensions in the short term. It just requires 
a strong political will. 
B. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
Due to the transnational nature of PMCs, without an international regulatory 
system, national regulations cannot be sufficient to regulate the private military industry 
as a whole. There are three main reasons for this argument. First, PMCs can change their 
location from one state to another when things go wrong for them or when national 
regulations restrict their behavior and profit. Moreover, PMCs can change their business 
name, as well as their locations, in order to escape responsibility. Second, even if PMCs 
are regulated in strong states nationally, weak states and their citizens may face danger 
because of the use of PMCs by strong states. Thus, weak states must be protected against 
the use of PMCs by strong states on their soil. Third, as seen in the case of Croatia, PMCs 
can function against the embargoes of the international community, which could create a  
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threat to international peace attempts. Therefore, the establishment of an international 
agency under an overarching command, such as the United Nations, is required in order 
to support national regulations. 
Establishment of an international institution can be beneficial by implementing 
two functions. First, it can establish a registration requirement for PMCs to operate 
abroad. Registration with an international agency will give PMCs a more comprehensive 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Besides registration, an 
international agency can make a blacklist of companies that would include previous 
corporations using different names, and their owners and administrators. This blacklist 
can work as guidance for states in their national registering and licensing systems. 
Moreover, non-governmental organizations can also use this blacklist for hiring security 
companies. Second, it can impose restrictions on states in the use of PMCs on foreign 
soils, especially in weak states, in order to prevent unintended consequences. The 
potential restrictions can be on the type of functions, the number of contractors, the 
nationality of contractors or the maximum period of military contracts.  
Besides an international institution, an international law, which defines PMCs and 
their employees, and the juridical responsibilities of parties (territorial state, principal 
state and home state) is needed. Moreover, in case of some legal vacuums that emerge 
between the national laws of parties, and in case of extreme crimes against humanity, a 
comprehensive international jurisdiction, such as the International Criminal Court, must 
be in effect to try and punish those responsible. Furthermore, international law must 
establish corporate responsibility for PMCs and state responsibility for acts against 
criminal law and the use of PMCs within the international regulatory system. The main 
purpose of this is to increase internal control of PMCs and the effectiveness of national 
regulatory systems and laws by increasing the consequences of unlawful behaviors of 
PMCs for companies themselves, and their home states. 
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PMCs are alternative security providers for states that must be considered from 
the aspect of CMR. However, most of the old theories of CMR do not cover PMCs 
because they deal just with the military. The control dimension is the only subject of old 
theories. Effectiveness and efficiency, which are presented as new dimensions of civil-
military relations by Bruneau and Matei, are not the subject of old theories. Among CMR 
theories, the principal agent theory is the one most suitable to explain the structure and 
relationship of PMCs and states. In fact, it is more suitable for the PMCs’ realm than the 
military. However, it is not sufficient to find solutions for the tensions in relations 
between PMCs and states due to its static nature. At this point, the importance of “new 
institutionalism” begins. In other words, my argument is that the solutions for the 
problems in PMCs regulation are related with national and international institutions. 
PMCs are not a new phenomenon of this century. However, the most recent and 
the most extensive use of PMCs is in the Iraq War and its aftermath. Even though 
problems with the use of PMCs had been known before, they have been more visible to 
the international community since the beginning of the Iraq War. Moreover, the Iraq case 
is a perfect example in which two extreme types of states can be examined: the United 
States as a strong state and Iraq as a weak state. I classify states as weak or strong by 
looking at capabilities and institutions of states. In realm of PMCs, the incentives of 
states change according to the types of states. Strong states have four main incentives for 
using PMCs: PMCs are allegedly cheaper than public armed forces; they are flexible and 
rapidly deployable; they relieve the task burden of public forces; and they are good tools 
for escaping from the political pressure of the use of public forces. Thus, the incentives of 
strong states are related to effectiveness and efficiency and political reasons. In contrast, 
in most cases, PMCs are the only option for weak states in order to survive, because they 
do not have sufficient public forces and it is not easy to obtain rapid foreign assistance 
due to political reasons.  
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The problems imposed by PMCs are related to all three dimensions of civil 
military relations: control, effectiveness and efficiency. However, as in the case of 
incentives, the types and degrees of problems are not the same for the two types of states. 
There are three main reasons for this argument. First, most PMCs are based in strong 
states. Second, from the aspect of the principal-agent relationship, while strong states 
often have principal and home state roles, weak states usually have territorial state role 
without having complete control. In other words, PMCs are out of the control of weak 
states, even if they operate in their own territory. Finally, PMCs can harm the sovereignty 
of weak states due to insufficient institutions and national laws required to deter unlawful 
PMC actions. In contrast, homeland and citizens of strong states (such as the U.S.) are 
distant from the theater and their strong institutions and national laws are effective to 
protect their sovereignty.  
As mentioned above, the case of Iraq includes two different types of states. Even 
though it is not clear which incentive is dominant over the others for the United States, it 
is obvious that the main purpose was to increase effectiveness and efficiency. However, it 
is not wrong to say that the United States has not yet reached its goal. First, the extensive 
use of PMCs caused waste of taxpayers’ dollars due to insufficient contracting processes, 
oversight and enforcement mechanisms, which are indispensible elements of principal-
agent relations. Second, the absence of congressional oversight and public consent for 
using PMCs has damaged democratic values. Finally, the extensive use of PMCs in Iraq 
damaged the U.S.’ international reputation as an advocate of human rights and justice, 
due to the immunity it provided for PMCs. These are important challenges, but the 
United States has the capacity to overcome them all. It needs political will to do that. As 
for Iraq, the main problems are about the survival of new democratic Iraq. First, PMCs, 
especially those that are foreign, threaten the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. 
Second, the implementation of operational functions may damage the development 
efforts of the ISF. Finally, PMCs, especially the local ones, can be seen as legal 
opportunities to be armed by ethnic groups. Thus, Iraq needs more than just political will. 
Moreover, it is not easy for Iraq to deal with all the dimensions of civil-military relations  
 
 91
for PMCs. In the short term, the efforts of the Iraqi Government must be focused on the 
control dimension. And, the easiest way of doing this is to impose limitations on foreign 
PMCs and the operational functions of PMCs in Iraq.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the literature about the regulation of PMCs, several options are proposed. 
Among them, two extreme ones—a complete ban and self-regulation—are impractical. 
PMCs are so integrated into the operations of states that states will suffer if they ban the 
activities of PMCs. Moreover, PMI is already self-regulated. If it has been working 
effectively, why are we talking about problems? 
My argument is that a registration and licensing system can be beneficial for 
regulation at the national level. Moreover, the system must be supported by national laws. 
Furthermore, the national regulation is not sufficient, by itself, due to PMCs’ 
transnational nature. An international regulation must be established to support national 
regulations. International regulation should be in two parts. First, an international 
institution, under an international organization such as the UN, should be established. 
This institution will function as a registering agency, which will prevent the movement of 
PMCs locations and also keep the blacklist of PMCs and their administrators. The second 
part is extension of international criminal law to cover PMCs and individual contractors. 
The responsibilities of states, when territorial states’ national laws are ineffective, must 
be organized by international laws. Furthermore, the state must be responsible for the 
unlawful actions of PMCs and individual contractors who are not tried or prosecuted. 
PMCs are important actors for states and the international community as a whole. 
If we must live with them, we also must learn to control them. Moreover, we should learn 
to promote them for international peace. For example, PMCs may be used under the 
command of the UN in peacekeeping operations, if they are regulated at both national 
and international levels. These expectations must wait until effective regulation at 
national and international levels are established. Otherwise, as the international 
community witnessed in Iraq, PMCs cause serious problems. 
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In sum, efforts at both levels (national and international) are required for an 
effective global regulation of PMI. Moreover, as stated by Avant, “Regulatory efforts, 
whether formally coordinated or not, are most likely to direct behavior in as stable way if 
they reflect common expectations and encourage similar behavior.”267 As argued by 
Avant after 2005 efforts of different actors such as the UN and the U.S. (as the most 
important and capable state for regulation) changed their stands towards a common and 




                                                 
267 Deborah Avant, “Governance Dynamics and Regulation in the Global Private Market,” Draft 
Paper, 3. 
268 Ibid., 14. 
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